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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of James Christian Scott for the Master of Arts in 
History presented April 24, 1995. 
Title: Germany, Great Britain and the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of 
Spring 1941. 
There are few events in the history of humankind which have been more 
compelling than the Second World War (1939-1945). Unfortunately, most of 
what transpired during this period of history stands obscured by events such 
as D-Day, Kursk, and Midway, all happenings which popular history has been 
more than happy to dwell upon. 
This study' s intent is to, with the use of primary materials, analyze one of 
the more "obscured" happenings of the Second World War, the Rashid Ali 
al-Kilani Revolt of April and May 1941. Central to this work is an assessment 
of the policy responses of both Great Britain and Germany to the Baghdad-
based revolt. It also seeks to answer the following question: why did Great 
Britain approach the coup with great urgency, while Germany, for the most 
part, paid it very little attention? 
In the case of Great Britain, its traditional power position in the Middle 
East, and possession of both the Suez Canal and extensive oil stocks, was 
challenged by Axis activity in north Africa, the Balkans and Crete. The Iraqi 
coup simply exacerbated the British problem. London's fears were valid and 
its successful response reflected as much. 
2 
For Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler, ideological concerns took 
precedence over a Middle Eastern campaign. A Nazi invasion of the Soviet 
Union, an event which, by design, would destroy Slavism, Bolshevism, and 
much of world Jewry, plus gain greater Germany "living space," was primary 
to Hitler's thinking in the spring of 1941. Furthermore, the Fuehrer's desire 
for an Anglo-German "understanding" seems to have influenced his attitude 
in regards to the coup. 
Conclusions are also drawn that the policy paths chosen by each European 
player during the coup were met with dissension. In Great Britain's case, 
Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell felt that aggressive 
British action in Iraq might antagonize Arab nationalism. For Germany, 
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was a major advocate of an anti-
British strategy and corresponding Nazi activity in Iraq. The Rashid Ali coup 
represented the last opportunity for Ribbentrop, prior to "Barbarossa," to 
expose the great vulnerability of the British Empire. From this, proffered is 
the theory that Ribbentrop, through an exploitation of the Iraq coup, was 
perhaps attempting to dissuade Hitler from an invasion of the Soviet Union. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As the fall of 1940 approached, the Nazi war machine was truly on the 
move. In a mere four-year period, from 1936 to 1940, German aggression had 
partially or fully occupied Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, 
Norway, the Low Countries and France. 
The continued freedom of both England and the Soviet Union 
notwithstanding, Adolf Hitler had clearly become the master of Europe. One 
had to wonder how far the ambitious tentacles of Nazi expansion were to 
extend. Would Hitler be content with his string of foreign policy successes in 
Europe, or would he aim at a proliferation of German influence elsewhere? 
In the latter months of 1940, Great Britain stood virtually alone. France 
had fallen, the Soviet Union was tied into a non-aggression pact with 
Germany, and America's isolationist ways kept her aloof from the European 
war. With the new year approaching, the British found it necessary to 
consider the possibility of a German invasion. An additional point of 
concern during those days of crisis dealt with the nation's overseas 
possessions. The world-wide scope of the British Empire automatically 
entailed a good number of responsibilities: the protection of trade routes, 
lines of communication, raw materials, and within the context of world war, 
points of strategic interest. Clearly, despite the formidable size of the Royal 
Navy, both the breadth of Britain's holdings and the modest size of its army 
2 
persisted to keep the Empire, in the early stages of the Second World War, in 
a position of great vulnerability. 
One zone of English influence which appeared especially susceptible to 
potential problems was the Middle East. The spring of 1941, in the eastern 
Mediterranean, presented many pressures. Of primary concern to Great 
Britain were German operations in North Africa and the Balkans. In 
addition, there were some within leading British circles who believed that the 
advent of the war, and the many Axis victories which accompanied it, might 
bring resurrection to the always burdensome factor of Arab nationalism.1 
The impending Nazi rush on the Middle East, not to mention the Arab 
national threat, had the potential to turn Great Britain's Middle Eastern 
position into one of great instability. 
The status of the British-dominated Middle East seemed tailor-made for 
the opportunistic nature of German foreign policy--a simple combination of 
Nazi scheming with a bit of cooperation from the Arab nationalists could 
prove a massive foreign policy boon for Germany and a great step for pan-
Arabs in their effort to rid the Arab East of the Union Jack. Clearly, as victory 
for those fighting under the Axis banner continued, and British prestige 
waned, the chances of such contact occurring increased. 
British fears reached their highest point with the Rashid Ali al-Kilani 
Revolt of April and May 1941. Perhaps the brightest flash-point of Arab 
dissent during the Second World War, the Iraqi coup d'etat represented a 
great number of things. First, the revolt reflected the attempt by a subjugated 
1 Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and other Studies (London: 
Frank Cass, 1974), 276-277. 
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state to break the yoke of foreign domination.2 Second, it represented the age-
old imperialistic rivalry which had existed between European powers.3 
Third, the timing of the coup took place within the context of world-wide 
conflict, and also at a time when the British Empire's prestige was at its nadir. 
Fourth, it provided a rare moment in Iraq's history where it was able, through 
German intriguing, to wield a certain degree of leverage in its dealings with 
Great Britain. And finally, the coup was a watershed--it clearly defined the 
extent to which Great Britain was willing to go, not only to save its Empire, 
but also save itself. 
In August 1965, Valentin Berezhkov, interpreter in the Soviet embassy at 
the time of operation "Barbarossa," the German invasion of Russia, provided 
a fascinating account of a meeting which took place between German Foreign 
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Soviet Ambassador to Germany 
Vladimir Dekanozov.4 During the 22 June 1941 interview, Ribbentrop 
explained that in view of Soviet provocation, Germany had been forced to 
launch a preemptive attack. However, according to Berezhkov, just as Soviet 
officials were leaving the room, the Nazi foreign minister hurried after them 
in an effort to explain his aversion to "Barbarossa." Berezhkov went on to 
recount Ribbentrop pleading the following: "Make it known in Moscow that 
I was against the invasion!"S 
The Berezhkov recountal provides us with just one of many references to 
2Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 1. 
3fuid. 
4Geoffrey T.Waddington, "Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union, 1937-1941," 
in Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, ed. David Dilks and John Erickson 
(Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1994), 7. 
Sib id. 
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the apparent skepticism Ribbentrop had for "Barbarossa." This dissension 
was most prominently manifested in his attempted construction of a series of 
anti-British, pro-Soviet alliances between 1937 and 1941. The crowning 
achievement of Ribbentrop's diplomatic crusade was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 
August 1939. Ribbentrop reveled in this diplomatic victory--there were few 
who believed it could be done, and like Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-1889) 
and his policy against France seven decades earlier, the foreign minister saw 
Great Britain's defeat as a mere matter of time. 
However, "Barbarossa" precluded all that Ribbentrop had worked so hard 
to achieve. Hitler's gravitation towards an anti-Soviet stance became more 
apparent after the winter of 1940/41. And, after the Berghof conference of 
January 1941, it should have appeared to most high-ranking Nazis, including 
Ribbentrop, that Hitler was sold on a move against the Soviet Union. If we 
assume that Ribbentrop as well as other Nazis were opposed to an invasion of 
the Soviet Union, how might they dissuade Hitler from attempting as much? 
An analysis of the failed Baghdad coup may help in providing an answer. 
The coup, in an far as German foreign policy in 1941 was concerned, 
should be viewed as significant. It provided an opportunity for those who 
opposed "Barbarossa" to expose the great vulnerability of British possessions 
in the Middle East, and in doing so provide an alternative strategy. In 
attempting to understand Germany's conduct during the coup, it is vital to 
analyze the varied attitudes within the German government regarding their 
relation to the future of German foreign policy. Accordingly, the revolt can 
be viewed as a crossroads, where German foreign policy, under the 
endorsement of Hitler, opted for a distinctly anti-Soviet stance as opposed to 
5 
that advocated by Ribbentrop and others. 
In view of this, one must consider a few crucial questions. First, how could 
this area have meant so much to the British and, at the same time, so little to 
Adolf Hitler? Furthermore, one might wonder, after considering Hitler's 
disinterest in the coup, what the revolt represented to those in the German 
government who supported its full exploitation? For example, was it an 
instance much like the Rashid Ali coup which Ribbentrop had in mind when 
he, on 7 March, ordered the Foreign Ministry to develop greater activity in 
Arab lands and to pay close attention to the question of "how this problem 
[was] to be handled with reference to [Germany's] aim of achieving England's 
defeat"?6 And finally, how plausible is it that the Rashid Ali Revolt could 
have played a sizable role in altering the course of the global war? In 
addressing such issues, this study will endeavor to analyze as well as criticize 
the foreign policy paths chosen by both Great Britain and Germany during the 
revolt. 
The coup will not serve as this work's focal point. Rather, the primary 
purpose of the revolt should be likened to a prism--its initiation created a 
dispersion of events which reflected the policy attitude of the events' primary 
players. Acting as a "prism of history," the coup exposed both the weaknesses 
and strengths of the foreign policy goals of Great Britain, Germany, and, less 
importantly, of Italy and the Arab world. 
To address the post-coup responses of these states adequately, it is vital to 
consider a certain degree of background material. It would be haphazard to 
try to present and analyze the events of April and May of 1941 without 
6Documents on German Foreign Policy, (London-\Nashington, 1950-1964), 
series D, vol. XII, no. 133. Henceforth known a~ D.G.F.P .. 
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placing them within their proper historical context. Accordingly then, the 
next chapter will attempt to elucidate the fundamentals of Arab nationalism 
in Iraq and the Middle East, and its ties to Great Britain, Germany, and, of 
course, the coup. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND ARAB NATIONALISM TO 1939 
The Rashid Ali Revolt was, by no means, a spontaneous act committed by 
a group of power-hungry politicians. Rather, it was initiated by a cell of men 
whose intentions were both deep-seated and profound. Basically, the coup 
served as a sort of boiling point where the age-old frustrations of a great 
number of individuals converged. The primary component of the 
conspirators' actions was the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. In order to 
understand the Arab nationalist movement, especially its relation to the 
Rashid Ali coup, it is necessary to recount and analyze its history. 
Furthermore, in order to view Arab nationalism and its role in the coup 
properly, it is crucial to consider the parallel development of German and 
British policy agendas in the Arab East from the First World War onward. 
As did other nationalisms, Arab nationalism aimed at independence from 
foreign control.7 It also possessed a pan-Arab dimension which called for the 
ultimate union of all Arab peoples into a single, independent state comprised 
of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Arabia.a A ready and most relevant parallel to the 
pan-Arab cause was Hitler's attempt to bring all ethnic Germans or 
7Geoffrey Warner, Iraq and Syria, 1941 (Newark, Delaware: University of 
Delaware Press, 1974), 11. 
BC. Earnest Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar 
Years," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 (February 
1988): 69. 
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Volksdeutsche under the umbrella of one greater German state. In theory, as 
the Hungarian German stood on par with the Bavarian, so too did the 
Yemeni stand in union with the Syrian. As will be seen, this very 
commonality would prove a major factor in the development of relations 
between the leadership corps of the Arab world and its Teutonic associates in 
the latter 1930's. 
The origins of modern Arab nationalism can be traced back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Most of the movement's ire, at that time, 
was directed against the Ottoman Empire, the overlord of the Arab world. 
With the advent of the First World War, Turkey cast its lot with Germany 
and the Central Powers. As a result, Great Britain and its Entente allies 
sought to foment Arab revolt against the Ottomans.9 In return for Arab 
assistance, the British government promised to realize the dearest of all pan-
Arab aspirations--the creation of an independent, unified Arab state. 
However, as the policy aims of their Turkish allies and the pan-Arabs were 
incongruent, any German hope of attaining collaboration with the Arabs was 
hindered by its alliance with the Ottoman Empire. 
The extent of Britain's assurances, prior to the initiation of the Arab revolt 
in June 1916, were found in a vague series of letters to an Arab leader, Sharif 
Husayn, from the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry 
McMahon.10 Although the gist of the missives reflected London's 
willingness to meet Arab demands for independence, McMahon was careful 
to include a number of conditions. The most significant related to the French 
9Donald M. McKale, "Germany and the Arab Question in the First World 
War," Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1993): 236. 
lOwarner, 11. 
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government's desire to hold a certain degree of influence in the Levant. In 
consideration of their ally, the British deliberately excluded the coastal strip of 
Syria from their promises to Husayn.11 As the Arab leader found the French 
demand repugnant, the issue was tabled until after the war.12 Therefore, in 
the summer of 1916, Arab rebels found themselves wary of two things as they 
prepared to act: first, how reliable were McMahon's assurances for 
independence, and second, how likely was the possibility of a renewed foreign 
presence in the Middle East. 
In the spring of 1916, and unknown to Arab nationalists, Great Britain, 
France, and Russia concluded the notorious Sykes-Picot Treaty. The 
agreement called for the partitioning of the Asian sections of the old Ottoman 
Empire into zones of influence. Generally speaking, the treaty assigned to 
France, Britain, and Russia, respectively, the areas of Syria, Mesopotamia, and 
Turkish Armenia.13 Palestine was to fall under international control.14 The 
division of zones, excluding that of the newly created Soviet Union, was 
given finality with the April 1920 San Remo Conference.IS This meeting 
established that under the supervision of the League of Nations, France 
should be granted mandatory control over Syria while Great Britain would 
hold the like over Iraq and Palestine.16 
11Dan Eldar, "French Policy Towards Husayn," The Middle Eastern Studies 







The policy concerns of France and Great Britain were more than adequately 
accommodated by San Remo. Gaining Palestine enabled Great Britain to 
extend its influence onto both banks of the Suez Canal, while Iraq guaranteed 
oil concessions and an overland bridge for transit between the Mediterranean 
and the Persian Gulf. France, for her part, gained undivided control over the 
whole of Syria. Its occupation of the Levant signaled the abolishment, in July 
1920, of the Arab government at Damascus. The Damascus government, set 
up in October 1918, under the leadership of Husayn's son, Faysal, was what 
little London and Paris would offer the Arabs in the form of a post-war 
concession. Needless to say, the conclusion of the Entente agreements proved 
a stinging disappointment for the Arabs. 
As far as Germany was concerned, the Versailles Treaty of 1919 put an end 
to its activities in the Middle East. It compelled the German government to 
cede "overseas possessions and special rights in dependent countries such as 
Egypt."17 Berlin also lost properties in the Ottoman Empire.18 Furthermore, 
the domestic problems which besieged Germany after the war forced the new 
Weimar government to look almost exclusively inward. Not for another 
fifteen years would Germany reappear in the Arab East. 
The Balfour Declaration widened the Anglo-Arab rift in November 1917. 
The document essentially promised British aid in the establishment of a 
national Jewish homeland in Palestine.19 The convenience for Great Britain 
in following such a policy dwelled in the notion that not only was it able to 
17Ibid., 6. 
18Jbid. 
19Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe. 1939-1945 (Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, 1979), 2. 
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secure moral sanction for its occupation of Palestine, but it also won 
substantial kudos in the eyes of world Jewry.20 Coming as no surprise, the 
Arab majority in Palestine jibbed at the idea of Jewish settlement. The 
resulting tensions between Arab and Jew festered for the next two decades. 
And the Palestinian situation would only find itself exacerbated by the exodus 
of Jews from Germany after the ascension to power of the anti-Semitic Nazi 
regime in 1933 (between 1933 and 1936, the Jewish population in Palestine 
grew from 192,000 to 355,000).21 
In reaction to the Jewish influx, Arab discontent was quickly transformed 
into armed rebellion in 1936.22 Great Britain responded to the region's 
instability by forming a fact-finding commission, which concluded that 
Palestine be partitioned into spheres of influence.23 However, as fiery heads 
prevailed, neither the Jewish nor the Arab camp could find satisfaction in the 
commission's resolution, each side believing itself entitled to the whole of 
Palestine. In an effort to allay Arab fears of continued Jewish immigration, 
London, in 1939, issued a White Paper which essentially placed a quota on the 
number of Jews allowed into Palestine.24 But, as the Arabs still remained 
dissatisfied with the British decision, it was becoming more evident that 
London's hold on the Middle East was loosening. 
Surfacing as one of the most crucial figures in the Arab nationalist 
movement in Palestine was Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of 
20ttirszowicz, 7-8. 





Jerusalem.25 As the head of the Arab High Committee, a nationalist 
organization, the Mufti was viewed by pan-Arabs as the tacit leader of their 
movement. Exiled from Palestine for his hand in Arab dissent, the Mufti 
arrived in Baghdad on 16 October 1939. His move to Baghdad opened a new 
chapter in the development of pan-Arabsim in Iraq--it provided leadership 
and inspiration to an ultra-nationalist mentality which had been incubating 
in Iraq for the last two decades. 
From as early as its establishment in 1920, it was clear that Iraq would be 
profoundly affected by the European agreements. As a country under 
mandate from the League of Nations, Iraq found its leadership coming from 
two alien entities: the British government, and Faysal Husayn, the son of 
Sharif and leader of the deposed Damascus government. The British 
government was "alien" for obvious reasons: to many Arabs, Great Britain's 
status as a foreign power asserting its mandate was no different from years of 
Ottoman rule. England's first act of state was the imposition of Faysal as the 
ruler of Iraq. Upon arriving in Iraq in 1921, "accompanied by British officials, 
he was a stranger to the country and his social base of support was narrow."26 
Entering a highly heterogeneous society, Faysal had to pull his support from a 
patch-work of religious, tribal, ethnic, and, above all, familial loyalties. The 
new king had the unenviable task of integrating this plurality of allegiances 
into the alien notion of national territorial integrity.27 The anti-British, anti-
25Joseph Nevo, "Al-Hajj Amin and the British in World War II," Middle 
Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 Oanuary 1984): 3. 
26 Abbas Kelidar, "Iraq: The Search for Stability," Middle East Review 6, no. 
4 (Summer 1979): 7. 
27Ibid., 8. 
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Husayni attitude of the new government's many dissidents manifested itself 
in a revolt, in 1921, which spread throughout the tribal areas of the Euphrates 
and the regions north and east of Baghdad.28 As a result, Great Britain lost 
four hundred of its nationals, forty million pounds, and a great deal of 
confidence in its ability to fulfill the Iraqi mandate.29 
The rebellion prompted London to install a system of indirect rule. The 
new mode of governance, in Iraq, was established on the British model--it 
came complete with parliament, political parties, and cabinet.30 Great Britain 
maintained influence over Iraqi policy-making by assuring that its own 
advisors sat in all the ministries.31 Such would be the case for the next eleven 
years, at which time, in 1932, Iraq became the first modern Arab state to obtain 
independence. 
It is important to mention, however, that after the termination of the Iraqi 
mandate, Great Britain still retained a significant presence in the state's 
affairs. The extent of British influence in 1932 matched the provisions of the 
1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The agreement provided for a close alliance between 
the two states. A number of privileges given to Great Britain included the 
following: air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba and the right to use the ports, 
airfields, and railways of Iraq.32 With these advantages in hand, Great Britain 
was able to exert sizable influence over the country's economic and political 
28Reeva Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 50-51. 
29fuid. 
30Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq. 1932-1958 (London: Oxford 





After its release from mandate status, the Iraqi state had seemingly come of 
age. Despite evident vestiges of British control, Iraq stood as a model for the 
many states within the Arab world which aspired to one day gain 
independence and serve as an active participant in the world community. 
However, in 1936, Iraq became the first Arab state to experience a coup d'etat. 
The 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup holds significance for two reasons. First, the event 
introduced the highly nationalistic Iraqi military as a prime player in the 
formulation of state policy-making, a position that it held until 1941. And 
second, along with the military's ascension came the subsequent reappearance 
of Germany as a primary figure in the development of Middle Eastern affairs. 
Much of this German reemergence can be attributed to the great admiration 
which Iraqi ultra-nationalists, primarily those in the army, had for the 
German nation and its National Socialist ideals.33 
One may look at the 1936 coup as a political ground-breaking of sorts for 
the Iraqi military as the event made it, in the words of Majid Khadduri, 
"virtually the sole deciding factor in the rise and fall of almost all Cabinets 
from 1937 and 1941."34 As the army rose, its political doctrine followed in 
accordance. The military was extremely nationalistic and was comprised of 
officers who believed that a strong army-led regime in Iraq was imperative if 
the country was to exorcise foreign control, unite all Arabs, bring aid to fellow 
Arab states in the fight against imperialism, and provide a strong sense of law 
33Francis R. Nicosia, "Fritz Grobba and the Middle East Policy of the Third 
Reich," in National and International Politics in the Middle East, ed. Edward 
Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 213. 
34Khadduri, 124. 
and order in the country.35 The military's leading clique was known as the 
"Golden Square," and was comprised of Colonels Salah ad-Din as Sabbagh, 
Kamil Shabib, Mahmud Salman, and Fahrni Sa'id. Under the "Golden 
15 
Square's" leadership, the army was able to galvanize its strong influence on 
the Baghdad government through its close relationship with various civilian 
officials, the most significant being Rashid Ali al-Kilani.36 Al-Kilani was 
unmistakably anti~British and a founding member of the Ikha al-Watani 
party which came to prominence with its opposition to the previously 
mentioned 1930 Treaty of Alliance. However, Iraq's extremists did face 
opposition from a more moderate group of nationalist politicians. Led by the 
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id, this cell, as I<hadduri states, "was favorably 
disposed towards Great Britain and foresaw grave danger to the Arab world 
from identification of Arab nationalism with totalitarian ideologies."37 Nuri 
essentially believed that the only sensible way of gaining a pan-Arab union 
was through patience and compromise with Great Britain and France. 
Furthermore, he saw any alliance with Germany as a fast and sure way of 
alienating Great Britain and destroying progress already made. But, as things 
stood in 1937, the military had, quite evidently, entrenched itself as the 
predominant force in Iraqi politics. 
How can one explain the presence of a pro-British prime minister in a 
government dominated by a pro-German military? Nuri's rise to prime 
minister had been sanctioned by the four colonels because of a mutual dislike 
35Edith and E.F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National 




both camps had for the deposed Jamil Midfa'i regime (1937-1938).38 
Furthermore, it may also have been the case that when the military chose to 
champion Nuri's rise in December 1938, it did not realize the true extent of 
the candidate's pro-British convictions. In the following pages, further light 
will be brought to the estrangement of Nuri and the military. 
The Iraqi military' s ascent followed in conjunction with events which 
were taking place in Europe. One such occurrence was the appointment of 
Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany. Based on an amalgam of historical, 
cultural, and racial awareness, the new government sought to restore the 
greatness which Germany had known prior to Versailles. It has been stated 
earlier that the Nazi regime endeavored to bring about the union of all ethnic 
Germans. Accordingly, by 1939, Germany had made great strides in doing 
such--Austria and the Sudetenland had both become part of Hitler's greater 
German Reich. 
Aptly enough, the Nazi state's ability to achieve its ethnic union effectively 
drew the admiration of many Arab nationalists, particularly those in Iraq.39 
Germany's accomplishments excited the Iraqis, who looked upon themselves 
and the Germans as two peoples who shared similar historical experiences. 
In order to better understand Iraq's strong interest in the Nazi German rise, 
one must analyze the relationship which existed between Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire prior to and during the First World War. 
At the tum of the century, Wilhelmine Germany looked upon the flaccid 
38Eliezar Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (London: Pall 
Mall, 1969), 25. 
39Reeva S. Simon, "The Teaching of History in Iraq Before the Rashid Ali 
Coup of 1941," Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 1 (January 1986): 43. 
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Ottoman Empire as an entity prime for colonization as well as economic 
exploitation.40 The Germans also viewed the Empire as a vehicle which 
might enable them to compete with British and French interests in the 
region.41 In order to achieve these policy goals, Germany sought to inculcate 
Turkish political and military officials with the benefits of "cultural 
nationalism."42 Surfacing with the rise of German Romanticism at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, this school of thought emphasized the 
glories, past and present, of a people's language and history~ In essence, the 
Wilhelmine government sought to utilize "cultural propaganda" as a means 
of assimilating Turkey's educated military and civilian elite to the ways of 
Imperial Germany, and, as a result, galvanize Turko-German ties. 
The Wilhelmine government's policy had indeed affected a wide portion 
of Turkish society. However, it is important to mention that just as ethnic 
Turks were digesting the ideal of "cultural nationalism," so too were many 
ethnic Arabs within the Ottoman military and government. Arabs were 
becoming increasingly wary of the Ottoman government's Turkification of 
the Empire. In view of this growing Turkish cultural influence, Arabs looked 
to their own cultural past by reading books which spoke of heroes and the 
Arab conquest of Spain.43 Furthermore, those Arabs who were most affected 
by German policy, the military, surfaced as the movement's vanguard and 
helped perpetuate various secret societies which sought to spread Arab 
40Simon, Iraq Between the Two Wars, 21. 
4lfuid., 10-11. 
42Ibid., 20-21. 
43Simon, "The Teaching of History in Iraq Before the Rashid Ali Coup of 
1941," 43-44. 
identity and culture.44 In essence, a new form of nationalism was 
developing from the pattern which had been handed to the Turks by the 
Germans. 
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Aptly enough, after the creation of the kingdom of Iraq, many of the Arabs 
who had been educated by the Germans in the Ottoman Empire carried this 
sense of "cultural nationalism" southward. Especially after receiving its 
independence in 1932, Iraq was quick to develop as a hot-bed of Arab 
nationalism.45 With Syria and Palestine still under foreign control, it was 
natural for Arab nationalist leaders to turn to Iraq. Truly, as it soon became 
vaunted as the Prussia of the Arab East, many Arabs looked to Iraq as the 
most promising country to achieve the pan-Arab union.46 
Iraq's fervent nationalist and pro-German sentiments did not elude the 
watchful eye of Berlin as the new German regime began to realize the 
importance of attaining an Arab-German rapprochement.47 In an effort to 
fan the Arab fire, the German government, as early as 1932, initiated 
propaganda activities in the Arab East.48 In that same year, the head of the 
Hitler youth, Baldur von Schirach, made a visit to Baghdad.49 Nazi 
propaganda found an echo in the rise of paramilitary organizations such as 
Iraq's Futuwwa, a group which was designed with the specific intent of 
bringing the nationalist ideal to the country's youth. 
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Germany's most effective agent in the Middle Eastern propaganda war was 
its minister to Iraq, Dr. Fritz Grobba. Schooled in Arab culture and history 
and fluent in Arabic and Turkish, Grobba was no stranger to Middle Eastern 
affairs.so He harbored much faith in the great potential of the pan-Arab 
movement. In late 1937, he believed that "the friendship of the Arabs for 
Germany [was] almost instinctual." Grobba also felt that "the friendship of 
the Arabs for Germany [was] still active in the leading class in Iraq, Syria, and 
Palestine ... " Grobba expressed his own views on the future of German 
policy in the Arab East by stating that "Even if Arab friendship towards 
Germany is determined above all by the Arabs' own interest, it is an 
important factor for Germany, which we can make both political and 
economic use of."51 Quite clearly, it was not just those within the pan-Arab 
camp who saw promise in German-Iraqi collaboration. 
During the inter-war period, pro-German, nationalistic sentiment could be 
found both within the Iraqi military and government. And, as addressed, this 
ideology was to become especially poignant after the army's rise to power in 
1936. These attitudes, coupled with the lingering sting of the wartime and 
post-war European agreements, made Iraq a country hostile to British 
interests while, at the same time, standing wide-open to those of Germany. 
With the Mufti's move to Iraq in April 1939, the pan-Arab movement quickly 
surfaced as a significant threat to Great Britain's Middle Eastern status quo. 
General Sabbagh of the "Golden Square" expressed his pre-coup Anglophobia 
by stating the following: 
50Nicosia, 208. 
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There is no more murderous wolf for the Arabs and no deadlier foe of 
Islam than Great Britain. As for the Arabs, they have been tom apart into 
small countries, communities and tribes that fight each other. Three 
hundred and fifty million Muslims are still groaning under the yoke of 
British imperialism. The bloody 'Lion Heart' of the Crusaders' wars was 
British and so was Allenby, who conquered Jerusalem and said, 'Now 
the Crusades are over.' If you give some attention to the location of 
countries and continents, and if you understand the strategic significance 
of the British wars, you will then see that the Arabs have no future unless 
the British Empire comes to an end.52 
Clearly, the Iraqi situation, on the eve of the war, was prime for revolt--
Sabbagh' s words were truly representative of many within the Iraqi 
government.53 However, despite such pervading sentiment, there were 
several factors which the prospective conspirators faced. First, the steady 
Nuri Sa'id was wise to the intent of many of the ultra-nationalists within the 
government and endeavored to forestall any move to revolt by the 
extremists. Second, the Iraqi government was still bound by the 1930 Treaty 
of Alliance to Great Britain. Any breach of this treaty could signal a quick and 
resounding response from the British, who persisted, despite their tenuous 
stance in the Arab East, to be the region's dominant military force. And 
thirdly, Germany was far away from Iraq-in 1939, Hitler's mind was set on 
attaining European hegemony, and a distance of fifteen hundred miles, in the 
meantime, kept German involvement in Iraq at a minimum. By no means 
would the success of a nationalist coup be a certainty. 
It was against this backdrop that the Rashid Ali al-Kilani revolt took place--
the Arab nationalist movement had found a home in Iraq, leadership in the 
Mufti, the military and Rashid Ali, an enemy in Great Britain, and in its eyes, 
52Be' eri, 372. 
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an ally in Nazi Germany. Needless to say, by the fall of 1939, the smell of 
revolution permeated the Baghdad air. In the next chapter the events which 
made up the coup will be recounted in brief. 
CHAPTER III 
THE COUP 
On 1 September 1939, Hitler's Wehrmacht invaded Poland. Two days later, 
on 3 September, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. The 
Second World War was effectively sent into motion. In a war which 
appeared to be on its way to having global ramifications, it was vital for states, 
when opting for a side, to do so prudently. Morality, opportunity, and 
security of neutrality, all proved factors which influenced the considerations 
of each member of the global community. And, in the case of Iraq, the issue 
of "choosing sides" proved an arduous business. 
At the outset of the war, Iraq was ruled by a regent, the Amir Abd al-Ilah, 
and a government headed by the pro-British Nuri Sa'id.54 As emphasized, 
however, Nuri's cabinet was replete with Anglophobes and was dependent 
upon the support of the army which, ever since the Bakr Sidqi coup of 1936, 
had served as the decisive force in Iraqi politics. As war between Great Britain 
and Germany appeared a certainty, Nuri was partial to a declaration of war on 
the latter. But the more extreme elements of the government favored the 
extraction of concessions in respect to Syria and Palestine as a price for doing 
so.55 In any case, without issuing a declaration of war, Iraq, on 5 September, 
severed diplomatic relations with Germany. By opting for the "middle 
course" and not declaring war on Germany, one crucial fact about the Iraqi 
54warner, 35. 
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government was revealed--two camps were vying over opposed policy 
agendas, and until one could gain preponderance, Iraqi policy, in respect to 
the war, would remain ambiguous. 
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By the spring of 1940, Nuri began to sense his grasp on the course of Iraqi 
policy loosening. After proposing a series of reforms dealing with the 
electoral laws and with reform and settlement of land disputes in the 
Diwaniya area, the prime minister was met with dissent from within the 
government.56 Much of the government's criticism of Nuri could be 
attributed to the influential intrigues of the "Golden Square."57 Vexed by 
Nuri' s close relationship with London, the four colonels saw great promise in 
their promotion of Rashid Ali as a replacement to the current prime 
minister. By March, Nuri was enveloped by opposition, from both those in 
the anti-British camp and those within his own group who frowned upon 
him for not taking a more assertive role against the "Golden Square."58 As a 
result, on 31 March, Nuri resigned in favor of Rashid Ali, with the provision, 
however, that the former prime minister be allowed to take on the position 
of foreign minister. In assuming such a post, Nuri hoped to continue to 
influence the maintenance of a Iraqi policy of cooperation towards Great 
Britain.59 
The changing of ruling parties did not bode well for Great Britain. As 
things stood, in the summer of 1940, Rashid Ali neither allowed the 






Germany's Axis partner, Italy. Making matters worse were the swirling 
rumors that the Iraqi government was in the process of renewing diplomatic 
relations with Germany. Upon hearing such news, London's Ambassador to 
Iraq, Sir Basil Newton, asserted that if Iraq was to resume relations with 
Germany, Great Britain would, in turn, be compelled to reconsider her 
relations with Iraq.60 Newton further conceded that London had no 
confidence in Rashid Ali. Such a barb simply brought aggravation to an 
already shaky relationship existing between the two governments. And 
when, on 9 January, the Iraqi government solicited Great Britain for weapons 
and money, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Anthony 
Eden, bit back by stating that London only supplied pounds to "loyal allies."61 
Later that month, and without surprise, the British government insisted that 
Rashid Ali be removed from his post as prime minister. 
Great Britain's request induced the regent to intervene and use his 
influence in a effort to force the prime minister to resign.62 Fortunately for 
Abd al-Ilah, certain variables were making his task easier to complete. First, 
the news of British military success in the western desert of Egypt helped dull 
the edge of pro-Axis sentiment in the Baghdad government. Second, 
economic sanctions were having a draining effect on the whole of Iraq. And 
finally, Rashid Ali harbored a deep fear of the threat of civil war which 
appeared to be on the verge of erupting between the country's pro and anti-
British camps.63 Ultimately, the prime minister tendered his resignation via 
601bid., 201. 




cable, on 31 January. 
The newly formed government came under the leadership of general Taha 
al-Hashimi. The rationale for Taha's selection rested upon the fact that both 
the regent and the more extreme elements of the government, especially the 
"Golden Square," respected the general and had much faith in his ability to 
rule fairly. Aptly enough, the new prime minister's central task was to bring 
reconciliation to the tensions which had been lingering between the pro-Axis 
clique and the regent.64 Taha also endeavored to persuade the "Golden 
Square" to accept a policy of conciliation towards Great Britain. However, on 
28 February, 1941, at a meeting which consisted of the Mufti, Rashid Ali, and 
three members of the "Golden Square," the policy of the Taha government 
was reviewed. Those in attendance came to two conclusions: first, it was 
decided that breaking-off relations with Italy was inconsistent with Arab 
interests; and second, if Taha were to insist on carrying out a policy 
unacceptable to the nation, he should then be asked to resign in favor of 
Rashid Ali.65 
In essence, with the meeting's adjournment, the fate of the Taha 
government was sealed. The conspirators decided to act on 1 April by first 
alerting the army. Taha was then handed an ultimatum which proposed 
collaboration between himself and the pro-Axis group. After Taha refused 
the extremist demand, the regent's palace was surrounded. Although the 
regent was able to escape, the coup had succeeded, and for the meantime the 
conspirators had effectively gained control of the government. Clearly, the . 




be focused on what sort of policy measures Great Britain, Germany, and Italy 
would apply to the Baghdad crisis. 
CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
After viewing the military character of the British campaign in Iraq, one 
will generally recognize that it was one of exceptional quality--under great 
strain, the British government quickly turned impending disaster into 
satisfying victory. However, beneath its exterior of thwarted sieges and called 
bluffs, one will also find that the British expedition was plagued and, it would 
be safe to say, driven by the geopolitical fears and biases of the many high-
level officials which were involved in the quickly developing art of Middle 
Eastern "trouble shooting."66 In essence, the British expedition could easily be 
characterized as one which held a certain duality--in no way did the 
formulation of the British policy match the flawless nature of the campaign 
itself. And although those involved were able to win the day, the process 
which eventually yielded a British victory was, by no means, one reflecting 
unanimity. 
The strategic and tactical control of the Iraqi operation fell under the 
influence of three primary command centers: London, Cairo, and Delhi. 
From the outset of the crisis, it became evident that each camp was going to 
advocate the policy which best accommodated its own regional agenda. By 
virtue of this, two schools of thought quickly developed. Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, and East Indian Commander-in-Chief Sir Claude 
66Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and other Studies, 276-280. 
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Auchinleck, favored armed intervention, while others, like Middle Eastern 
Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell, and the British Ambassador to Iraq, 
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, both well attuned to the potentialities of Arab 
nationalism, saw armed intervention as risky and provocative. They 
believed that diplomacy and conciliation were the soundest roads to take. In 
addition to considering the campaign's divisive nature, this chapter will 
strive to recount the events good and bad, which comprised the British phase 
of the Iraqi dilemma. 
The Iraqi coup could not have come at a more inopportune time for Great 
Britain--The Afrika Korp' s counter-offensive in North Africa, the German 
drive into Yugoslavia and Greece, the impending Nazi assault on Crete, and 
the Baghdad coup were all unfolding nearly simultaneously. The British 
Empire was in the process of experiencing one of its darkest hours in the 
spring of 1941. Certainly the last thing that the British needed in the eastern 
Mediterranean was an additional problem added to those which already 
existed. As this was the case, Churchill found himself compelled to, as he put 
it, "make sure" of Iraq.67 
Churchill's first move was to secure the Iraqi port city of Basra by armed 
intervention. Basra served as a vital link in the passage of communications 
through the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Although Churchill 
intended to give the Baghdad government the impression that the troops 
were in transit to Palestine, he was clearly intent on the simple goal of 
securing Basra. In an effort to do so, Churchill, on 8 April 1941, sent the 
following dispatch to the Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery: 
67winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand Alliance 
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Some time ago you suggested that you might be able to spare another 
division taken from the frontier troops for the Middle East. The situation 
in Iraq has turned sour. We must make sure of Basra, as the Americans 
are increasingly keen on a great air assembling base being formed there to 
which they could deliver direct. This plan seems of high importance in 
view of the undoubted Eastern trend of the war. I am telling the Chiefs of 
Staff that you will look into these possibilities. General Auchinleck also 
had ideas that an additional force could be spared.68 
Upon receiving the Churchill missive, Amery conveyed it to Auchinleck, 
who promptly offered to divert to Basra an infantry brigade and a regiment of 
artillery originally intended for Malaya.69 Auchinleck also saw fit to secure 
the transfer of 400 infantrymen from India to the British enclave at Shaiba.70 
However, on 10 April, Rashid Ali stated that the coup d'etat was merely a 
matter of internal politics and nothing that should preclude Great Britain 
from exercising her rights of passage under the Treaty of Alliance. 
Ambassador Cornwallis found the Iraqi government's conciliatory stance 
encouraging, and expressed, in a 11 April telegram, that a landing at Basra 
might be viewed by Baghdad as a blatant act of provocation.71 Lord 
Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, spoke in defense of the landings by stating the 
following: 
But we are moving into a position that affects our general standing in the 
Middle East, that has the most important potential repercussions on India 
and Iran, that affects our oil supplies (so vital to the admiralty) in Iran and 
Bahrein (and to a lesser extent Kuwait); and I have no doubt that we must 
be prepared to take a strong line now .72 
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brigade group was able to disembark at Basra without opposition. Churchill, 
then, after receiving word of the mission's safe arrival, requested the 
diversion of two or more other brigades, also headed for Malaya.73 The 
factors that inspired the Rashid Ali camp to maintain its calm can be 
conjectured. Although it is difficult to provide definite reasons for his stance, 
one can assume that Rashid Ali viewed strong cooperation with treaty 
demands as an open door to possible British recognition of the outlaw 
government, and it is perhaps more probable, that the premier was expecting 
Axis aid.74 
As it became clear that London was deadly serious about its treaty rights 
and that Axis aid, in the meantime, would be on hold, the coup 
government's attitude quickly changed. Upon learning the 30 April landing 
date of the Indian troops, Rashid Ali said that he "could not give permission 
for any fresh landings until troops already at Basra had passed through the 
port. "75 His specific demands were as follows: first, that the troops proceed as 
rapidly as possible to Rutha; second, that the British government announce 
well in advance any intention to ship more detachments; and three, the total 
number of British trodps should not exceed, at any one time, the strength of 
one mixed brigade.76 The Iraqi government further stated that the British 
government, by its effort to establish a base at Basra, was in violation of an 
amendment to the treaty, made unilaterally by Baghdad on 16 July 1940, 






Iraq."77 In essence, the Iraqis believed that they alone were responsible for the 
defense of lines of communication. However, on 28 April, Cornwallis, albeit 
with reticence, replied that the treaty did not contain the limitations which 
the Iraqi government had suggested. So, in accord with the prime minister's 
aggressive stance, the landings went forward and pressed into action the ill-
prepared Iraqis. 
The conspirators placed the bulk of their military strength around the 
Royal Air Force base at Habbaniya. Habbaniya is located roughly fifty miles 
west of Baghdad and is connected to the capital city by a desert highway which 
crosses the Euphrates near the town of Falluja.78 The Iraqis had the great 
fortune of occupying a series of strategically advantageous uplands 
overlooking the British base. The rebel siege force was comprised of two 
infantry brigades, along with artillery and armor. Not intended to be 
anything more than an air force training base, the cantonment, commanded 
by Air Vice Marshal Smart, held just over 2,200 military personnel, and no 
fewer than 9,000 civilians.79 The air strength of the base was limited. 
However, thanks to the arrival of a few Gladiator fighters from Egypt, plus 
the base's own assortment of eighty-two training aircraft, Smart was able to 
patch-together a functional force of four squadrons.so Early on the morning 
of 30 April, an Iraqi officer presented a message from his commander 
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demanding that all flights cease and that no one should leave the base.81 
Making matters worse was the report from reconnaissance craft that the Iraqi 
force was being bolstered by a steady flow of reinforcements.82 It soon became 
clear to Smart that time was of the essence. His sole material advantage 
rested in air power, which would only be effective during daylight hours.83 
Furthermore, the Iraqi occupation of vital bridges over the Tigris and 
Euphrates meant that the base was cut off by all access but the air.84 And 
finally, it could have occurred to Smart that, with time, the Iraqi forces would 
only get stronger and more confident. Smart clearly had several reasons for 
wanting to fire the first shot. 
The air officer commanding" ... decided that it was essential to attack these 
troops without further warning. Accordingly, in the early morning of 2 May 
an improvised air force ... attacked the Iraqi forces."85 Taking part in the raid 
were air elements from both Habbaniya and Shaiba. In total, the R.A.F. was 
able to make 193 sorties, and it soon became evident that Iraqi guns were 
much less daunting than originally thought.86 As Smart believed that a 
unified attack on the camp was unlikely, he saw fit to initiate further air 
missions against the Iraqi Air Force as well as the line of communications 
between Habbaniya and Baghdad. Over the next three days, the R.A.F. 
enjoyed comfortable air superiority throughout Iraq, and was even able to run 
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a sortie towards Iraqi military installations at Mosul. During the night of 5 
May, patrols of the King's Own Royal Regiment raided Iraqi positions on the 
Habbaniya plateau. At dawn on 6 May it was found that the Iraqis had 
abandoned their positions. With this, the siege was raised. Smart, for his 
efforts, received a note of appreciation and congratulation from the prime 
minister: "Your vigorous and splendid action has largely restored the 
situation."87 
Meanwhile, on 2 May, while the defenders of Habbaniya were fighting for 
their lives, the Chiefs of Staff in London were in the process of gathering a 
relief column for the besieged base. Any thought of considering the Basra 
enclave a candidate for relieving Habbaniya was precluded by the fact that 
"any northward advance from Basra was impeded both by the Iraqi sabotage 
of communications and by the annual floods on the Two Rivers ... " 
Therefore, London found itself in a position to solicit the services of General 
Wavell: 
In view of situation in Iraq which is not that which we visualized when 
India took responsibility it seems operational command should now pass 
temporarily to Mideast whence alone immediate assistance can be given. 
This will take place forthwith unless you see strong objections.SS 
London quickly discovered that Wavell voiced much more than "strong 
objections" to its request. There appear to be two primary factors which 
influenced Wavell's reticence. First, Wavell, "like most British officers [was] 
strongly pro-Arab."89 This is how Churchill described Wavell. But it is 
unlikely that Wavell was an actual proponent of all that being pro-Arab 
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entailed, i.e., pan-Arab Union, British withdrawal, etc. Rather, it is safe to say 
that Wavell's pro-Arab sympathies went no further than advocating any 
policy which might placate the Arab world and, as a result, maintain peace as 
well as British preponderance in the Middle East. Therefore, also "like most 
British military officers" the general realized how vital the Middle East was to 
the home island. Wavell's greatest fear rested in what he saw as the potency 
of Arab nationalism and the phenomenon's threat to British interests in the 
region. And, of course, this phobia found fertile ground in Wavell' s 
participation as Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief during the twilight of 
the Palestinian Revolt. Not only was the general highly sensitive to the 
threat of Arab nationalism, but he also realized the effect which British 
aggression might have in fomenting a region-wide revolution. A second 
concern of Wavell' s was simply that, in addition to the surfacing of the Iraqi 
problem, his position in Palestine was in the process of being invested from 
all directions but the south. It seemed to Wavell that the Middle East would 
stand as the Germans' main point of concentration.90 In the general's eyes, 
the advent of the Iraqi crisis made an already impossible situation even more 
so. Part and parcel of Wavell's fear of envelopment was his great concern 
over the lack of resources at his disposal. Obviously, with men and material 
tied-up in the western desert of Egypt, fleeing off the Greek mainland, and 
preparing for the imminent Nazi invasion of Crete, Wavell felt alone and 
under equipped. These two factors, therefore, were at the crux of Wavell's 
apprehension to attempt any forceful intervention into Iraq. Wavell wanted 
90John Kennedy, The Business of War (New York: William Morrow and 
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nothing to do with Iraq, and even if he had, according to his appraisal, he 
simply would not have the resources to make any difference.91 
Thus, London transferred control of an extremely crucial operation from 
Auchinleck, who had both the force and will to· be effective, to Wavell who 
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was more than reluctant to assume the operation's logistical and political 
demands. Just before receiving London's dispatch, Wavell was in Cyrenaica 
addressing General Erwin Rommel's assault on Tobruk. The Wavell's 3 May 
response to the London dispatch reads as follows: 
I have consistently warned you that no assistance could be given to Iraq 
from Palestine in present circumstances and have always advised that a 
commitment in Iraq should be avoided. 
My forces are stretched to limit everywhere and I simply cannot afford to 
risk part of forces ·on what cannot produce any effect. 
I can only advise negotiation with Iraqis on basis of liquidation of 
regrettable incident by mutual agreement with alternative of war with 
British Empire, complete blockade and ruthless air action.92 
Despite the general's obvious displeasure, he nevertheless attempted to 
"create the impression that a large force was being prepared for action from 
Palestine."93 The force (code name "Habforce"), consisted of one mechanized 
brigade, one field regiment, one lorry-borne infantry battalion and three 
mechanized squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force, a fighting group 
made up of Arabs.94 Although formidable in size, the force had no armored 
cars or tanks and possessed very few anti-aircraft or anti-tank weapons.95 
According to Wavell, "Habforce" was too weak and too late. Furthermore, 
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the general believed that the expedition deprived him of his only response 
force to Vichy-controlled Syria which Wavell believed, and correctly so, was 
under the influence of Axis intriguing.96 
London's attitude towards Wavell' s posture reflected both the concern and 
alarm with which it was viewing the whole crisis. 
We much deplore the extra burden thrown upon you at this critical time 
by events in Iraq. A commitment in Iraq was however inevitable. We 
had to establish a base at Basra, and control that port to safeguard Persian 
oil in case of need. 
The line of communication to Turkey through Iraq has also assumed 
greater importance owing to German air superiority in the Aegean Sea ... 
Had we sent no forces to Basra the present situation at Habbaniya might 
still have arisen under Axis direction, and we should have also have had 
to face an opposed landing at Basra later on instead of being able to face to 
secure a bridgehead there without opposition ... There can be no question 
of accepting Turkish offer of mediation. We can make no concessions. 
The security of Egypt remains paramount. But it is essential· to do all in 
our power to save Habbaniya and to control the pipeline to the 
Mediterranean.97 
Tensions between London and Cairo were great, and Wavell's 5 May reply 
did nothing to mollify Whitehall's growing anxiety: "Your [message] takes 
little account of realities. You must face facts." The general believed that 
such a force, weak as it was, would have, at best, a marginal effect on 
Habbaniya. Furthermore, he questioned the ability of the R.A.F. cantonment 
to withstand the Iraqis. Wavell went on: "I feel it my duty to warn you in the 
gravest possible terms that I consider that the prolongation of fighting in Iraq 
will seriously endanger the defense of Palestine and Egypt. The political 
repercussions will be incalculable, and may result in what I have spent the 
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last two years trying to avoid, namely, serious internal trouble in our bases."98 
Wavell closed his message by admonishing London to accept a negotiated 
settlement via Turkish good offices. 
Wavell's reply reached Whitehall at nearly the same time that General 
Auchinleck offered to dispatch five more infantry brigades from India. Not 
surprisingly, John Connell writes that, "Churchill was 'not content' with 
Wavell's [efforts] but 'gratified' by Auchinleck's."99 Therefore, after 
consulting with the Chiefs of Staff, whose support he had, Churchill sent the 
following message to Wavell on 6 May: 
Settlement by negotiation cannot be entertained ... Realities are that 
Rashid Ali has all along been hand-in-glove with Axis Powers, and was 
merely waiting until they could support him before exposing his hand. 
Our arrival at Basra forced him to go off half-cock before the Axis was 
ready. Thus there is an excellent chance of restoring the situation by bold 
action, if it is not delayed. Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, advised Defense 
Committee that they are prepared to accept responsibility for dispatch of 
the force specified in your telegram at the earliest possible moment.100 
In response to the prime minister's message, on 8 May, Wavell stated he 
feared that the known handicaps of "Habforce" might bring about its quick 
defeat, and, that Great Britain should avoid "a heavy military commitment in 
a non-vital area."101 To prevent either or both outcomes, Wavell again 
admonished Whitehall to negotiate.102 
Realizing his general's "cares and devotions," Churchill, on the next day, 
succinctly expressed Whitehall's attitude on the vital nature of the upcoming 
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Our information is that Rashid Ali and his partisans are in desperate 
straits. However this may be, you are to fight hard against them. The 
mobile column being prepared in Palestine should advance as you 
propose, or earlier if possible, and actively engage the enemy, whether at 
Rutha or Habbaniya. 
Having joined the Habbaniya forces, you should exploit the situation to 
the utmost, not hesitating to try to break into Baghdad even quite small 
forces, and running the same kind of risks the Germans are accustomed to 
run and profit by. There can be no question of negotiation with Rashid 
Ali ... Such negotiation would only lead to delay, during which the 
German air force will arrive.103 
Churchill further enunciated the campaign's objective while, at the same 
time, he allayed Wavell's fears of being "bogged-down" in Iraq by adding the 
following: "You do not need to bother much about the long future in Iraq. 
Your immediate task is to get a friendly Government set up in Baghdad, and 
to beat down Rashid Ali's forces with the utmost vigor."104 On 13 May, 
Wavell responded favorably to Churchill's orders in stating that he would 
"try to liquidate [the] tiresome Iraqi business quickly."105 
The "Habforce" column arrived at Habbaniya on 18 May. Despite the fact 
that the garrison had been secured, Iraqi forces had persisted in holding the 
strategic bridge across the Euphrates and Falluja. On 19 May elements of 
"Habforce" and the air base itself set off to break the Iraqi force which, in 
essence, served as the only wall of resistance between Habbaniya and 
Baghdad, "Habforce' s" destination. After three days of contact, and not a 
single British casualty, "Habforce" had given itself a clear road to Baghdad. 





and Italian air resistance on the "northern air fields of Iraq."106 
With its rear secure, "Habforce" set off for Baghdad on the evening of 27 
May. The British contingent reached the outskirts of the capital city on 30 
May. Despite the scant numbers of "Habforce," its presence sent Rashid Ali 
and his party fleeing for Persia.107 The next day, an armistice was signed and 
a new government under the leadership of Nuri Sa'id was established. With 
this, the Rashid Ali Revolt was ended, and Great Britain, in the midst of 
further developments in the western desert and Eastern Mediterranean could 
now look upon its Mesopotamian flank with great relief. 
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Figure 1. Map of Iraq. Source: Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq. 
1932-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 398. 
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CHAPTER V 
OVERVIEW OF THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN 
By the end of May 1941, two flash points of hostility had ended: first, the 
situation in Iraq had been diffused with splendid execution, and second, the 
stand-off between the Wavell and Churchill camps had ceased. In addition to 
the problem at hand, namely the coup, the Iraqi campaign was highlighted by 
a clash between the aggressiveness of Churchill and the calculation and 
trepidation of Wavell. Having surveyed the facts of the campaign, one may 
now look at British policy in Iraq with a critical eye. 
Without much doubt, the key to Great Britain's victory in Iraq, and its 
eventual stabilization of the Arab East, rested upon the aggressive attitude of 
Churchill. The prime minister's stance was most aptly characterized in the 
following statement: "What matters is action; namely, the swift advance of 
the mobile column to establish effective contact between Baghdad and 
Palestine. Every day counts, for the Germans many not be long."108 Major-
General John Kennedy, Deputy Director of Military Operations, states that 
"Churchill thirsted for action ... He fretted at the delays which are 
inseparable from the preparation of modern fighting forces, and he pressed us 
incessantly to 'grapple with the enemy.'"109 Complementing Churchill's 
aggressive nature was his tendency to welcome "the gamble" --at a time when 
the British military was ill-equipped to fight on par with the Germans, 
108Kenned y, 62. 
109Jbid., 121. 
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Churchill believed that Great Britain " ... must not shrink from running ... 
small-scale military risks, nor from facing the possible aggravation of political 
dangers from failure."110 And finally, the prime minister immersed himself 
in the challenge at hand; he became a student of the problem, a scholar, and 
would find interest "in the minutest details of everything the Chiefs of Staff 
did," pouring "out floods of memoranda upon all problems, great and 
small."111 The prime minister's dabbling, at times, however, could bring him 
to reverse the decisions of military authority, as with Wavell, or in his later 
operation "Tiger." All of these Churchillian characteristics--action, audacity, 
leadership, and an indefatigable zest to be "in the know" --certainly gave the 
British campaign a great advantage. 
The ready and willing hand of Auchinleck was vital to the prime 
minister's efforts in Iraq. In view of Wavell's reticence, it would have been 
difficult for Churchill to secure Basra without the timely assistance of 
Auchinleck. Auchinleck' s readiness to help should not, however, be looked 
upon as being totally selfless. A secure Iraq was important to India. 
According to Auchinleck, " ... it [was] impossible for India to dissociate herself 
from the formation of policy in that area. Not only [was] success or failure in 
Iraq vital to the safety of India but most of the forces and material employed 
in that theater must come from India."112 
Clearly, both Churchill and Auchinleck had their reasons for wanting a 
quick, forceful end to the revolt. Churchill most clearly expressed his anxiety 
over the Middle Eastern dilemma in a 28 April directive to the British War 
llOJbid. 
111 Ibid., 161. 
112Connell, Auchinleck, 80. 
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Cabinet which stated: "The loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a 
disaster of the first magnitude for Great Britain, second only to successful 
invasion and final conquest. It is to be impressed upon all ranks that the life 
and honour of Great Britain depends on the successful defense of Egypt."113 
The prime minister obviously considered Egypt vital to the defense of the 
Middle East and the British Empire. The country served as the linchpin 
which, by means of the Suez Canal, maintained the flow of communications 
between the eastern and western parts of the Empire. The Canal served as the 
primary portal "by which reinforcements would reach the Mediterranean 
Fleet; it would be an essential waterway of the Middle East Base; and it would 
be the means of exit if the Mediterranean Fleet had to go to the Far East. "114 
The Canal's usefulness was perhaps most aptly reflected in the speedy transfer 
of East Indian troops from Bombay to the crucial "Crusader" (November 1941) 
and El Alamein (Fall 1942) campaigns.115 The value of the Suez Canal lay in 
the fact that these forces needed to travel only 950 miles as compared to the 
4,200 miles which would have been needed by way of the Cape of Good Hope. 
The Canal also simplified the transit of oil from fields in Persia and 
Mesopotamia to Allied operations in North Africa and Europe. Quite simply, 
113Kennedy, 109. 
114Playfair, vol. I, 89. 
115operation "Crusader" of 18 November 18 1942 was the British Eighth 
Army's first desert offensive. As Richard Humble states, '"Crusader' not only 
cracked the myth of the German 'Desert Fox,' Rommel, and the invincibility 
of his Afrika Korps: it was the first clear-cut defeat suffered by the German 
Army since the outbreak of the Second World War, after over two years of 
unbroken triumph on all fronts." Richard Humble, Crusader (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1987), ix. The El Alamein campaign of Fall 1942 was General Bernard 
Law Montgomery's decisive repulse of German forces just 63 miles west of 
Alexandria. 
at a time when the Empire was under the greatest strain, the Canal afforded 
Great Britain the flexibility and ease that it needed to assure the fast flow of 
troops and raw materials. 
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In addition to the Canal, Egypt "possessed the essential attributes of a large 
overseas base."116 After 1937, the country took on the characteristics of an 
advanced operational fortress with the ability to support naval, ground, and 
air forces. The Mediterranean Fleet had bases at Suez, Port Sa'id, and 
Alexandria, the latter being the most significant. In addition to the possession 
of coal, oil, and petrol stocks, Alexandria served as the repair base for the 
Royal Navy's heavy ships. It also acted as the chief supply depot for the 
British island fortress at Malta, a vital installation in the Allied effort to foil 
the shipment of Axis material through the Mediterranean to Tripoli. 
Likewise, Egypt was an essential link in the air route between Europe and 
India and all points beyond. Finally, Great Britain relied on the area to billet 
and support an army of roughly one-quarter of a million men. 
The Egyptian base and the forces there were quite impressive, but despite 
the Middle Eastern Command's size, Great Britain had reasons to be skeptical. 
The Chiefs of Staff were afraid of what German air power might do to British 
naval installations in the area: Alexandria, not being enclosed, and with its 
oil refineries too close to the port itself, was seen as a highly desirable air 
target; there was also much anxiety expressed over the vulnerability of oil 
refineries, and storage installations at Suez and Port Sa'id117 
Very real threats to Crete, Libya, and, of course, Iraq, exacerbated Great 
116Playfair, vol. I, 64. 
117Ibid., 110. 
45 
Britain's challenge to defend Egypt. An Axis-occupied Iraq would have 
jeopardized the safety of the eastern Egyptian frontier and might have proven 
an ideal base for German and Italian air missions into northern Egypt. Just as 
the prime minister issued the 28 April directive, Egypt's approaches were 
under intense pressure from Rommel, who was in the process of besieging 
Tobruk (350 miles west of Alexandria), and German forces in the Balkans, 
which were about to seize Athens. The German prospect of "envelopment" 
was indeed a looming fear in Great Britain. In fact, Kennedy stated during the 
spring of 1941, that "Whether we can hold onto the Middle East depends on 
one thing and one thing alone--whether the Germans concentrate seriously 
against us there. If they do, they will be able to develop attacks in considerable 
strength from the west through Libya, from the north through Turkey, and 
possibly from the northeast through the Caucasus and Persia."118 In short, 
the fall of Iraq into Axis hands would have made the German effort to 
"envelop" Egypt and the Suez Canal a much easier one. 
An additional reason for British action relates to Iraq's control of the 
overland route between Basra and Palestine.119 With the Suez Canal under 
Axis pressure from the west, the Basra to Palestine "bridge" took on greater 
importance since, in the event of a German victory in Egypt, it would serve as 
the prime conduit by which men and material from India and the Far East 
could travel to the eastern Mediterranean. This British concern was 
heightened by the additional point of British rights under the 1930 Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty. The defense of this agreement formed the essence of Great 
Britain's action in Iraq. And although the defense of British rights of transit 
118Kennedy, 137. 
119Piayfair, vol. I, 177. 
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seemed to be more of a convenient excuse than anything else, at the time of 
the coup, the stabilization of the Basra to Palestine road was a serious matter 
for Great Britain. 
Robert Leckie states in his workf Delivered from Evil that "The oil fields of 
the Persian Gulf nations contained those supplies that nourished not only 
British war-making capacity but its population and industry as well ... "120 
Oil had long been a commodity of prime importance to Great Britain. With 
the advent of war, oil became the lifeblood which enabled Britain and her 
allies to wage war against the Axis. British firms possessed crucial oil fields in 
Persia and northern Iraq at Kirkuk and Mosul. Because of these concessions, 
it was clearly to Great Britain's strategic advantage that Iraq and Persia be 
stabilized. Great Britain had to pay particularly close attention to the pipeline 
which ran from the Kirkuk and Mosul fields to Haifa. What made the Haifa 
refineries so crucial was their role as the principal fuel source for the 
Mediterranean Fleet.121 Obviously, if Axis forces had been able to get to the 
British pipeline, the mobility and effectiveness of His Majesty's ships in the 
Mediterranean would have been severely crippled. One cannot help but 
wonder what might have happened if supply lines to Rommel's Afrika Korps 
had been able to operate unhindered. The supply of Rommel's army was 
highly dependent upon the flow of Italian and German shipping across the 
central Mediterranean. However, British surface ship, submarine and air 
forces operating out of Crete, Egypt, Gibraltar, Malta, and Palestine were quite 
effective in slowing the tank forces of the Afrika Korps. 
120Robert Leckie, Delivered from Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 
209. 
121 Playfair, vol. I, 187. 
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A disaster worse than Great Britain being isolated from the bulk of her oil 
supplies would have been reserves falling into Axis hands. Wavell, in May 
1940, knew that Britain and its allies had "access to practically all the world's 
supplies of oil." He also believed that "Germany [was] very short of oil and 
[had] access to very limited quantities." Because of this, Wavell felt that the 
Allies were "bound to win the war."122 But, with the Afrika Korps pressing 
hard in the Western Desert, and the Axis building strength in the Aegean, it 
was not inconceivable that tables could have been turned in the favor of 
Germany. 
After 31 March, British Military Intelligence and Whitehall concluded that 
Germany was on its way to invading the Soviet Union on or near 10 June.123 
Earlier, Military Intelligence, for various reasons, believed that the 
Wehrmacht was poised to make war on the Middle East. For some time, 
Whitehall and its intelligence services were convinced, despite the presence 
of information that should have belied such a conviction, that the Germans 
were intent on destroying the British Empire through a move on the Arab 
East.124 In fact, in late April, the Department of Military Intelligence 
conceded, in a brief to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, John Dill, that 
"If Germany can beat us, Russia is in the bag. Russia does not represent an 
obstacle to Germany in her battle with Great Britain. A pincer movement (on 
Suez) is the most likely course."125 Such sentiment pervaded British strategic 
concerns until 31 May, when Military Intelligence, through information 
122connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier, 232. 
123F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. I 




extracted from "Enigma" intelligence, concluded that a German invasion of 
the Soviet Union was a virtual certainty: "It becomes harder than ever to 
doubt that the object of these movements of the German army and air force is 
Russia. From rail movements towards Moldavia in the south to ship 
movements towards the Varanger Fjord in the far north there is everywhere 
the same steady eastward trend. Either the purpose is blackmail or it is 
war."126 
It is important to mention that on the same day of the "Enigma" report 
hostilities in Iraq subsided with the signing of an armistice in Baghdad. 
Therefore, prior to the 31st, the British government had considered a possible 
German move into Russia as speculative. From Whitehall's point-of-view, 
rather than expecting an impending attack on Russia, it appeared as if all 
German roads led to the Middle East. With Libya, Greece, and Crete occupied, 
or on their way to being occupied, a German move into Syria and Iraq 
appeared to be part of a logical progression. Furthermore, in view of 
communications and oil, Great Britain's fear of a German "pincer move" was 
perhaps all the more justified. After all, the Middle East did belong to Great 
Britain--she relied on the region to fuel her war-making capabilities. 
Without these benefits Whitehall knew that its ability to compete with the 
Axis powers would be significantly curtailed. 
Under these circumstances, then, it would have been foolish for Whitehall 
to think that Hitler would not make a committed move into the Middle East 
through Turkey, Syria, or Iraq. It would have been equally careless for Great 
126fuid. "Enigma" was the German enciphering system. Despite the Nazi 
belief that it was unbreakable, Great Britain, with the aid of Polish decoding 
experts, was able to solve "Enigma" by the spring of 1941. 
49 
Britain to have neglected the Iraqi situation, even if Whitehall had known in 
April and May that the Germans were bent on moving into Russia. Most 
British experts believed that the Soviet Union could not hold-out for more 
than a month.127 They also felt, and correctly so, that the Middle East would 
have been Hitler's next move.128 A deep penetration into southern Russia 
would have given the needed resources and geographical position for the 
Germans to move into the Arab East. It was essential for Great Britain to do 
all that it could to stabilize and fortify its Middle Eastern bastion. An integral 
part of this effort was a speedy pacification of the Iraqi situation. 
From the British point-of-view, the first line of defense, in a German 
descent from the Aegean, would be Turkey. As Kennedy believed, "Turkey 
would be [Great Britain's] front line and [its] bastion."129 This made a pro-
British or, at least, neutral Turkey essential. Whitehall considered the 
Turkish army formidable, and thought that the Ankara government would 
"fight back" if she were attacked.130 In addition, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff prior to Dill, Sir Edmund Ironside, believed that "If Turkey comes in 
against the Germans there is no possibility. of Turkey being overrun such as 
there is in a country like Roumania whose army is not of high quality."131 
However, Great Britain viewed the issue of Turkish allegiance with anxiety. 
127Sir Alexander Cadogan, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, ed. 
David Dilks (New York: G.P. Putnam's and Sons, 1971), 182. Anthony Eden, 
The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 312. 
128Kennedy, 218. According to Directive No. 32, submitted on 24 July 1941, 
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In fact, a few individuals within British ruling circles felt that a feeble British 
performance in Iraq might alienate the Turks, and, in turn, send them into 
Axis arms. Auchinleck stated that" ... the fall of Iraq to the Axis would mean 
the loss of oil fields, and the possibility of Turkey swinging towards the 
Axis."132 In a 16 February brief, Kennedy captured the General Staff's mood 
on the issue, stating that the "support of Turkey is ... important since Turkey 
is the bastion of our position in the Middle East. If Turkey sees our reserves 
thrown away in Greece it may tip the balance against her resistance to the 
Germans. "133 One might infer that just as Ankara was eying the events in 
Greece it was paying an equal amount of attention to the British campaign in 
Iraq. A solid British performance was imperative as it perhaps meant the 
difference between a friendly Turkey and an antagonistic one. 
Not only might resolute action in Iraq by Great Britain reassure the Turks, 
it could also admonish other states to stay neutral or pro-British, lest they 
suffer the same fate as the Baghdad conspirators. Iraq was not the only state 
which was entertaining Axis intrigues--Egypt's Aziz al-Misri and King 
Farouk, Iran's Riza Shah, India's Subhas Bose, and Afghanistan's Abdul 
Majid Khan, certainly fell into this category.134 It was imperative that 
Whitehall be resolute in its Iraq policy. Great Britain's conduct in 
Mesopotamia could either prove a deterrent to opportunism or, as 
Auchinleck stated, "Britain's weaknesses would be revealed and other 
132connell, Auchinleck, 74. 
133Kennedy, 84. 
134Churchill, 485; D.G.F.P., vol. XIII, no. 120; Ibid., no. 145; P.J. Vatikiotis, 
The History of Modern Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press), 345. 
51 
interests in the area might be encouraged to support the Axis."135 
Churchill's policy attitude was contradicted by that of Wavell. As the 
reader has seen, Wavell's actions were encumbered by the conviction that his 
resources were too few and his problems in relation to the Arab nationalist 
question too many. We have spoken about the tremendous stress which 
Wavell's Cairo command operated under from the west and north during the 
spring and summer of 1941. This, coupled with the pan-Arab threat, 
understandably engendered a state-of-mind in Wavell which would not 
favor taking-on further operations. Wavell wrote: "I always disliked Iraq--
the country, the people and the military commitment ... it blew up at the 
worst possible time for me, when I had the Western Desert, Crete, East Africa 
and Syria on my hands, and no troops."136 
In all fairness to Wavell, the revolt brought to the fore poignant memories 
which had accumulated during his command in Palestine during the Arab 
revolt of the late 1930's. The uprising, which Wavell called "a very 
unsatisfactory and intangible business" made the general highly sensitive to 
the potency of Arab nationalism. And, in a way, this hypersensitivity blinded 
him from the more pressing issue at hand, namely, it appearing that the 
Germans were headed south. Action was imperative, and again, as Churchill 
stated earlier, Great Britain could not be daunted by "possible aggravation of 
political dangers from failure."137 Moreover, Churchill truly led by example. 
Perhaps his most notable 'gamble' was the launch of operation "Tiger," whose 
135connell, Auchinleck, 79-80. 
136Connell, W avell: Scholar and Soldier, 429. 
137Kennedy, 121. 
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beneficiary proved to be, ironically enough, Wavell. "Tiger" was the prime 
minister's effort to meet the needs of Wavell through the dispatch of a 
convoy carrying 307 tanks through the Mediterranean to Egypt.138 Churchill's 
move was risky for two reasons. First, and as the prime minister states, "The 
chances of getting the M.T. ships through the central Mediterranean 
unscathed were not rated very high."139 This was primarily because German 
dive-bombers operating from southern Europe dominated the area, and 
British shore-based planes were out of range.140 Second, the home island was 
dreadfully weak in the area of tanks. Of course, there was great fear that a loss 
of tanks, if "Tiger"were to fail, would bring demands "for their replacement, 
and consequently a further diversion of tanks from the home forces."141 As 
things turned out, four out of five ships arrived at Alexandria on 7 May and 
the P.M. labeled the operation a "brilliant success."142 
In view of "Tiger," it cannot be said that Churchill ever hesitated to meet 
Wavell's needs. In addition to shouldering responsibility for an act which 
essentially took protection away from the British people and sent it onto a 
perilous journey, Churchill had to deal with the "heat" from many of those 
within Whitehall, including Dill, Eden, and Kennedy.143 It is important to 
add that Whitehall was wary of a possible German channel crossing. 
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the prime minister was doing to better Wavell's situation, the very least that 
the general could have done was to reciprocate by meeting Churchill's needs. 
Furthermore, as Kedourie asks, "Was the strain on the prime minister in the 
spring of 1941. .. any less?"144 In fact, Kennedy recounts that Churchill's two 
most difficult decisions made during the war "were, first, to keep the fighter 
aircraft out of France, and, second, to send the tanks and other reinforcements 
to Egypt at a time when invasion seemed likely."145 Granted, Wavell was ill-
prepared for making war in 1941. But, unpreparedness was a universal 
predicament, e.g. the Habbaniya cantonment. Fortunately for Great Britain 
and the entire Allied war effort, Churchill refused to view this as a excuse for 
inaction. 
Looking beyond Iraqi borders, Rashid Ali had little more luck gaining aid 
than he did looking within. For example, upon hearing of the Baghdad 
revolt, Aziz al-Misri was blunt in telling Egyptian army officers, who were 
optimistic that they might "make Egypt a second Iraq," that they did "not 
know Iraqi politicians as well as [he] did."146 Rashid Ali found similar 
disinterest coming from Saudi Arabia's King Abd al-Aziz. The King told the 
Iraqi premier that he had "blundered and make a big mistake in fighting 
Great Britain at such a critical time, and that any difference of opinion 
between themselves and Great Britain should have been solved by peaceful 
means. "147 
144Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and other Studies, 280. 
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These reactions appear to indicate the simple fact that the Arab nationalist 
movement, at this time, appeared to be nothing more than a shapeless, 
ununified, counter position to British imperialism. It had very little popular 
and international appeal. One might be able to make a good case that 
nationalism, being a European import to the Arab East via Berlin and 
elsewhere, was, for the most part, incompatible with a highly stratified Iraqi 
society. 
This is not to say that the Rashid Ali coup d'etat was not based on the 
fundamentals and frustrations of Arab nationalism. Although Arab 
nationalism might have given birth to the Baghdad revolt, it was not, in the 
eyes of British leadership, save Wavell and Cornwallis, going to spread like 
wildfire throughout Great Britain's Middle Eastern position. Rather it was a 
bevy of military considerations which drove Whitehall's Iraqi policy. Those 
who mattered, those who were dictating policy (Churchill, Dill, Eden, 
Auchinleck), simply could not afford to look beyond pressing military 
developments at hand. British policy in the area generated itself--the region's 
strategic importance meant that the German ring which was quickly closing 
in on Suez took precedence. Iraq was not regarded as the flash point of a mass /1 
Arab movement, instead it was viewed as a possible German bridgehead in 
the Arab East. In fact, German efforts to exploit the Iraqi coup d'etat were not 
as energetic as they could have been. In light of this, Kedourie broaches an 
excellent point. German designs in north Africa were to be mostly small-scale 
and defensive, but because of the energetic initiative of Rommel, this 
primarily "defensive" operation turned into an offensively-minded foray 
which became a grave threat to British positions in Egypt and Palestine. As 
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Kedourie states, "How can the possibility of another Rommel be ruled out in 
the case of Iraq?"148 Also, could Wavell have afforded to isolate himself from 
India? We have already explored the possibilities relating to an Axis-
occupied Iraq and the impact on the flow of men and materials through the 
Suez Canal or the Basra to Palestine land bridge. As can be seen, inaction and 
negotiation, on the part of Wavell could have presented a number of pitfalls, 
as well as "far-reaching or lasting injury" to the Allied war effort.149 
Overrating the question of Arab nationalism detracted from the issue at hand 
which was to plug the ever-widening breach in Great Britain's Middle Eastern 
front. 
Four factors constituted the cornerstones of the British campaign, all 
having a direct relation to its active nature. One need only look to the 18 
April landing of Anglo-Indian troops at Basra to find they were the first key 
British move. This decision, as Churchill put it, "set [the Iraqis] off at half-
cock. "150 In essence, Whitehall's move fomented an overconfident, under-
equipped and undertrained Iraqi military into action. By doing this, Great 
Britain was able to confront the Iraqis who were without the benefit of Axis 
aid. The second vital move was the "spirited" preemptive strike by the R.A.F. 
at Habbaniya. As mentioned earlier, Smart's action robbed the Iraqi 
command of its strategic advantage which it held through its possession of 
the heights overlooking Habbaniya. Third, we can assume that the strength 
of Whitehall's policy in Iraq, perhaps admonished other pro-Axis cells 




throughout the British Empire from catching inspiration from Rashid Ali 
and his followers. Interestingly enough, in a 25 May message from the 
Iranian government to the German Foreign Ministry, the Iranians expressed 
its reservations about the proposed delivery of oil to pro-Axis forces in Iraq as 
it was fearful of British reprisals.151 Obviously, with British forces on the way 
to Baghdad, the Iranian government probably sensed that Churchill, perhaps 
learning of Axis-Persian collaboration, would not be content with stopping at 
the Tigris, but would rather opt for continuing on into Persia. In fact, two 
months later, the pro-Axis Bandar Shah government folded two days after 
the bold joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran was launched on 25 August. 
Finally, the most vital decision taken by Whitehall was one which shifted the 
command of "Habforce" from Wavell to the Chiefs of Staff. As Churchill 
recounted, the Chiefs of Staff "overruled from Whitehall the judgment of the 
man on the spot. They took the issue out of his hands and assumed the 
responsibility themselves for ordering the relief of Habbaniya and for 
rejecting all ideas of negotiation with Rashid Ali and of accepting Turkish 
mediation, which at one time was mentioned."152 
Quite clearly, the difference between British victory and disastrous defeat 
in Iraq dwelled in Whitehall's ability to decide between active or inactive 
policies. Fortunately for Great Britain and the larger Allied war effort, 
London chose action. This is not to say that it was incorrect for Wavell to 
consider the repercussions of a British defeat in Iraq; British prestige in the 
region would have hit rock-bottom and results could have been irreparable. 
Yet, with inaction there was an even greater chance that the same would 
1510.G.F.P., vol. XII, no. 552. 
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have unfolded. Therefore, the only route to take, was one of preemptive 
action. And through what Churchill christened a "brilliant success," Axis and 
Iraqi hopes were smothered, and British prestige in the Middle East was 
bolstered. 
CHAPTER VI 
GERMAN OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
If, for the British, the Iraqi campaign represented a stance of resolution and 
action, German policy in the region indicated much the opposite. In fact, the 
Reich's Iraqi policy, in the spring of 1941, could be best characterized as one of 
general inaction. Although some leading Germans did advocate the 
exploitation of British anxieties in Iraq, Churchill himself was to express, in 
retrospect, that "that Hitler cast away the opportunity of taking a great prize 
for little cost in the Middle East."153 
A look at Germany's Iraqi campaign, or "non-campaign," does provide 
some indication of what was unfolding in Berlin, as far as strategic and 
ideological priorities were concerned. The coup, functioning as a "prism of 
history," will enable the reader to view the divergence of attitudes within the 
German government concerning the nature of future Nazi policy towards 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union. One might even be able to proffer the 
idea, although inconclusively, that Iraq proved an "eleventh hour" move by 
a certain cadre of high-level German officials, led by Ribbentrop, to sway their 
superior, Hitler, from an impending invasion of the Soviet Union.154 The 
stance advocated by Ribbentrop, not to mention other notable Nazi officials, 
was essentially one of total war with Great Britain and, correspondingly, 




one will not be limited to surveying the meager military effort put forth by 
Germany and her allies, but rather he or she will find that Iraq represented a 
point of convergence where two philosophical positions, differing both 
ideologically and strategically, vied for primacy in the realm of Nazi foreign 
policy. Iraq truly brought to the fore the simple but weighted questions of 
whether Germany would head east, as laid down in Mein Kampf, or west, by 
way of Realpolitik? 
Because of this we cannot view Iraq as a mere "sideshow" of a much 
greater world conflict. Although obscure, it was a "point of no return" for 
Germany--Hitler's ability to squelch any concerted Nazi effort in Iraq basically 
buried the last viable alternative to a Russian campaign. This chapter will 
attempt to discuss the ebb and flow of Berlin's response to the Iraqi coup. 
Interestingly enough, it was not the Germans who initially sought the 
establishment of ties between the Berlin and Baghdad governments. Rather, 
in June 1940, it was the Iraqis who had planted the seeds for diplomatic 
contact between themselves and Germany. The most notable of the early 
"secret" meetings took place on 3 July, in Ankara, Turkey, between the Iraqi 
Minister of Justice Naji Shawkat, and the German Ambassador to Turkey 
Franz von Papen.155 Shawkat apologized for Iraq's breaking-off of diplomatic 
relations with Germany and also stressed the current policy of the Rashid Ali 
government in maintaining normal relations with Italy, and the growing 
nationalist trend of the Iraqi cabinet. Most importantly, Shawkat intimated 
that Germany would receive the support of the Iraqi army "when the time 
came."156 
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Such contact did not end with the Shawkat trip. In the fall of 1940 the 
Mufti's private secretary Osman Kemal Haddad, held close meetings with 
Nazi officials in Berlin.157 Haddad presented himself as the representative of 
both the Arab world and the Arab High Committee, an organization which 
he claimed comprised of nationalists from Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia.158 
His trip sought the establishment of a joint German-Italian declaration on the 
future of Arab-Axis relations. The declaration was to be comprised of the 
following five points: first, recognition of the full independence of the Arab 
countries; second, recognition of the Arab countries' right to unite; third, 
recognition of the right of Arab countries to solve the problem of the Jews 
living in Palestine or other Arab countries; fourth, a statement to the effect 
that Germany and Italy had no imperialistic designs in respect to Egypt and 
the Sudan; and fifth, an expression of sympathy for the Arab countries and of 
a desire for economic cooperation with them.159 
In return for a declaration of this sort, Haddad guaranteed the renewal of 
diplomatic relations with Germany, the availing of Iraq's natural resources to 
Axis interests, and his willingness to act as mediator between the Axis and 
other Arab states in reaching similar agreements160 Haddad also promised 
the dismissal of the pro-British Nuri from the government. What was the 
German response to the proposal? Despite taking a "positive stand" on the 
matter, Ernst von Weizsacker did say that the Reich Government would "be 
prepared to help with captured arms and money," but that it could "proceed 
157ttirszowicz, 83-84. 
158Jbid. 
159n.G.F.P., vol. X, no. 403. 
160Jbid., vol. XI, no. 118. 
61 
only in agreement with Italy."161 
As for the Italians, they viewed the declaration with a certain degree of 
skepticism. Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, felt that such a 
statement would not yield much--Italy had furnished aid for the Mufti in the 
past only to see it squandered.162 And second, a public declaration would not 
mesh with Italian imperialistic interests. The Middle East had been 
designated as its area of influence in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940.163 
In time, however, Germany was able to persuade Rome to consent to some 
sort of official statement. Made public on 23 October, 1940, it read as follows: 
Germany [Italy], which has always been animated by sentiments of 
friendship for the Arabs and cherishes the wish that they may prosper and 
be happy and assume a place among peoples of the earth in accordance 
with their historic and natural importance, has always watched with 
interest the s'truggle of the Arab co.untries to achieve that independence. 
In their efforts to attain this goal Arab countries can count upon 
Germany's [Italy's] full sympathy also in the future. In making this 
statement, Germany [Italy] finds herself in full accord with her Italian 
[German] ally.164 
From the Iraqi point-of-view there was disappointment as Shawkat 
lamented that he had expected more " ... namely a German declaration of 
Arab independence."165 The minister of justice had enough forethought to 
suspect Italo-German collusion, which was, to a certain degree, valid, as 
Berlin, at this time, persisted to respect the territorial designs of Italy in the 
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The 23 October declaration, despite Arab jibbing, should have been 
considered a diplomatic victory for the Axis. Without tipping their hand too 
much, Italy and Germany had effectively appeased pro-Axis elements enough 
to avoid alienating their prospective allies. For roughly the next six months, 
the Axis powers, especially the Germans, felt comfortable enough to keep 
their strategic focus on questions more relevant to the Occident. For instance, 
would Berlin let its W ehrmacht loose on London or Moscow? 
Perhaps the most intriguing of German ventures over the six months 
preceding the Iraqi coup was the development of an anti-British coalition. 
The brainchild of Ribbentrop, the Continental Coalition, as it grew to be 
known, was to consist of a most bizarre marriage of the following states: 
Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, France, and Spain.167 Despite persistent 
efforts by the foreign minister to build the coalition, Spanish, French, and 
Soviet obstinacy squelched any hope for the alliance. Nevertheless, since the 
Continental Coalition holds much relevance to the stance assumed by 
Ribbentrop during the Baghdad revolt, it will be discussed in greater detail 
later on. 
An additional operation Hitler considered at this time was an amphibious 
invasion of Great Britain (code name "Sea Lion"). As the R.A.F., however, 
had defeated the Luftwaffe in mid-September during the Battle of Britain, 
inclement weather made a channel crossing risky, and the German Navy 
lacked the resources needed for a more feasible crossing, "Sea Lion" had to be 
166fuid. 
167Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (New York: Crown Publishers, 1992), 316. 
63 
put off until spring of the coming year.168 With both "British-oriented" 
exercises stalled, Hitler now entertained the thought of moving on the Soviet 
Union, the planning of which had begun as early as December of 1940. His 
intentions were made known in the famous "Directive No. 21": "The 
German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush the Soviet Russia in a quick 
campaign ("Barbarossa") before the end of the war against England ... 
Preparations are to be completed by 15 May 1941."169 
Hitler, from this time on, was fixated on "Barbarossa." But there were 
those within the German government, both civilian and non-civilian, who 
were intrigued by events in Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean in general. 
The chief figure in the this pro-Iraqi camp was none other than Ribbentrop. 
The foreign minister was made privy to the potential of the revolt in a 9 
April, 1941, meeting with Ernst Woermann, Head of the Political Department 
of the Foreign Ministry. He explained that" ... there was now ... a cabinet 
which was to be considered the most nationalist and pro-Axis thus far, and 
that according to the available reports this cabinet had the full support of the 
Iraqi army ... "170 Woermann further stated that the coup government "was 
putting up stiff resistance to the English wishes for the stationing of English 
troops in Iraq and a more or less unrestricted right of passage."171 
Woermann' s presentation obviously excited the foreign minister, as it was 
his conviction "that in case no decision against England was obtained this 
year, the questions of the Middle East might become of decisive importance." 




Ribbentrop accordingly instructed the Abwehr to "organize an intelligence 
service in the Middle East, which would have to be confined to purely 
military matters," in addition to developing "sabotage" and "insurrections" 
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in Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.172 ·Ribbentrop further demanded the 
"immediate" organization of the Foreign Ministry's own intelligence service 
in "north Africa and the Middle East," independent of "the Abwehr and the 
SD service."173 He then went on to sat that " ... all of [their] work in the area 
mentioned be immediately and rapidly activated."174 
The next day, Ribbentrop, as requested by Woermann, acquired Hitler's 
approval for the dispatch of arms to the Iraqi rebels. But, in a 21 April 
message from Ribbentrop to Hitler, it was made clear that," ... the 
possibilities of giving assistance [had] been studied," and that " ... speedy 
assistance [was] possible only by air."175 The foreign minister included that," . 
. . direct intervention by Luftwaffe units in Iraq [was] out of the question, since 
that exceeded the range of the Luftwaffe."176 It was thought, however, that 
arms could be flown to Iraq through individual aircraft, provided they were 
given the benefit of stopping-over in Syria. This idea unofficially signaled the 
introduction of the Vichy government as a participant in the German 
venture. 
Meanwhile, with British resolve strengthening, it became apparent that 
the Iraqis were increasingly frustrated by the lack of Axis action. Accordingly, 
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on 24 April, Italian officials, in Baghdad, reported that " ... the Iraqi 
government was quite annoyed because it had yet received no reply to its 
request for Axis support by Axis aviation," as" ... the situation was becoming 
downright critical."177 
After hearing this news, Ribbentrop again took the matter to Hitler. 
Skillfully playing upon Hitler's desire to have a friendly Turkey at the time of 
"Barbarossa," the foreign minister reminded his Fuehrer that a British victory 
in Iraq would put the English in a position to influence Syria, which could, in 
turn, effect the actions of the Ankara government.178 His ability to recognize 
Hitler's interest in "Barbarossa" enabled Ribbentrop to keep the leader's 
attention. 
As far as the utilization of Vichy forces in Syria were concerned, 
Ribbentrop was hopeful of possibly obtaining French arms in Syria, which 
could then be flown a short distance to Iraq. The foreign minister did, 
however, believe that the confirmation of such a plan was highly contingent 
upon the strengthening of relations between Vichy and German 
governments .179 
The most glaring problem with the German stipulation was simply that it 
would take time to fulfill, a commodity which Rashid Ali and the Axis were 
short of, especially after the 2 May British repulse at Habbaniya. The coup 
government's urgency found reflection in the following 5 May message from 
Iraqi officials in Ankara to the German embassy: 
The Iraqi government requests immediate military aid. In particular a 
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considerable number of airplanes in order to prevent further English 
landings and to drive the English from the airfields. The Iraqi minister 
asked for an answer tomorrow if in any way possible.180 
If the Germans were going to pursue action in Iraq, they had to do so 
immediately. Ribbentrop, sensing opportunity passing, attempted to apply 
greater importance to the Iraqi question in the following 3 May message to 
Hitler: 
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If the available reports are correct regarding the relatively small forces the 
English have landed in so far, there would seem to be a great opportunity 
for establishing a base for warfare against England through an armed Iraq. 
A constantly expanding insurrection of the Arab world would be of the 
greatest help in the preparation of our decisive advance toward Egypt.181 
Finally, after a close appraisal of Ribbentrop's statement, Hitler consented 
"that everything possible be done with regard to military support."182 With 
Hitler's approval secured, Ribbentrop immediately turned to the idea of 
utilizing Syria, not just for her airfields and refueling facilities, but also for its 
plentiful stock of weapons which would be ideal for bolstering the fire-power 
of the Iraqi military.183 
It took very little time for Berlin to acquire the Vichy government's 
permission to utilize Syria for the proposed plan. The Vichy French, who 
seemed quite optimistic that the Germans would succeed in Iraq, on 8 May 
confirmed the following concessions: 
(a) The stocks of French arms under Italian control in Syria to be made 
available for arms transports to Iraq; (b) Assistance in the forwarding of 
arms shipments of other origin that arrive in Syria by land or by sea for 
Iraq; (c) Permission for German planes, destined for Iraq, to make 
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intermediate landings and to take on gasoline in Syria; (d) Cession to Iraq 
of reconnaissance, pursuit and bombing planes, as well as bombs, from the 
air force permitted for Syria under the armistice treaty; (e) An airfield in 
Syria to be made available especially for the intermediate landing of 
German planes; (f) Until such an airfield has been made available, an 
order to be issued to all airfields in Syria to assist German planes making 
intermediate landings.184 
What did Vichy get in return for assisting Germany? As William Langer 
states, the Germans "were to permit the rearmament of six French destroyers 
and seven torpedo boats, to relax the stringent travel and traffic regulations 
between the zones of France, and to arrange for a substantial reduction of the 
costs of occupation."185 
The first signs of German aid came through on 10 May with the arrival of 
the Reich's newly appointed representative to Iraq, Dr. Fritz Grobba. 
Accompanying the Nazi official were two Heinkel He 111 bombers. Further 
additions to the Iraqi arsenal included a squadron each of He lll's and 
Messerschmidt fighter-bombers.186 Meanwhile, a few days later, Rudolph 
Rahn, a special Foreign Ministry envoy, arrived in Syria to organize the 
proposed flow of munitions to Iraq. Rahn's efforts produced the first arrival 
of supplies into Mosul on 13 May. 
Despite the obvious Axis presence in Mesopotamia, the Iraqi effort was 
quickly losing momentum. Hitler's indifference, the overzealousness of the 
"Golden Square," the relatively meager flow of Axis aid, and the speed and 
the effectiveness of "Habforce" all contributed to the rebellion's eventual 
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failure. It was not until 23 May that Hitler finally issued "Directive No. 30." 
Coming at roughly the same time that Iraqi resistance was crumbling, the 
directive read as follows: 
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The Arab liberation movement in the Middle East is our natural ally 
against Great Britain. In this connection, the rising in Iraq has special 
importance. It strengthens beyond the boundary of Iraq forces hostile to 
England in the Middle East, disturbs English communications and ties 
down English troops and shipping space at the expense of other theaters of 
war. I have therefore decided to advance developments in the Middle East 
by giving assistance to lraq.187 
The directive clearly came too late. In fact, one day after its dispatch, many 
of those involved in the coup, including the Mufti, could sense its impending 
failure. The pan-Arab leader believed that despite a pan-Arab uprising's great 
promise, all would soon become moot "if the current uprising in Iraq, which . 
. . is the key to the situation should fail."188 The Mufti sealed a plea for more 
German aid by stating the following: "if Iraq should fall during these 
upcoming days, the anti-English movement throughout the whole Middle 
East would step-by-step succumb to British gold and intrigues."189 And upon 
hearing the false word of inflated British troop numbers, which came due to 
the efforts of British intelligence, the Mufti, and Rashid Ali were forced to flee 
to Iran, and Grobba to Mosul. 
Despite the exit of their leader, local commanders promised to continue 
the fight, provided the Germans assured "effective military aid."190 And 
Ribbentrop did state that more aircraft were in flight to Iraq. But, as the 
planes were unable to land due to the lack of sufficient fueling facilities, the 
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German promise rang hollow. With word of the Anglo-Iraqi armistice in 
Baghdad, and the false mention of the Mosul airfield's capture, Grobba left for 
Syria on 31 May.191 Later that same day, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head 
of the OKW (High Command of the German armed forces) sent the following 
message to General Felmy: "All forces are to gather at Alep. Their complete 
reverse is to be exercised until further intentions have been clarified with the 
French government in Vichy. Remove Iraqi insignia. Further orders will 
follow."192 
The Keitel dispatch effectively set the German pull-out from Iraq into 
motion. With this, the hopes of many within the German government were 
dashed just ten days before the launching of the most devastating military 
campaign of the twentieth century, "Barbarossa." So, now that the reader has 
been supplied with an overview of the events which made up the German 
campaign in Iraq, it is possible to discuss the "split" rationale characterizing 
Berlin's actions in the spring of 1941. 
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CHAPTER VII 
OVERVIEW OF THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN 
Did Ribbentrop view Iraq as a last-second opportunity to deflect Hitler from 
a Russian campaign? Unfortunately, in probing for an answer to this 
question, one discovers that there is no single document which directly links 
the foreign minister to such an intention. Be that as it may, Bloch, in his 
biography of Ribbentrop, characterizes the foreign minister's interest in Iraq as 
"bizarre."193 This was indeed true. It is also quite correct that Ribbentrop's 
character was itself very odd. However, in viewing the foreign minister's 
actions in Iraq, one must wonder if there was indeed method to his madness. 
Ribbentrop's foray into Middle Eastern affairs came on the eve of Hitler's 
coveted Russian campaign. Because we see close proximity between Iraq and 
"Barbarossa," should we not consider the extent of Ribbentrop's intentions 
during the months of April and May in 1941 as "bizarre," and as a result, 
worth viewing with a suspicious eye? Despite the absence of irrefutable 
evidence which might tie the foreign minister to what many hardline Nazis 
would have considered treasonous activity, an effort will be made, through a 
multitude of documents, to better understand the nature of Ribbentrop's 
intentions in Iraq and their relation to "Barbarossa." 
Several factors will be assessed in considering Ribbentrop's actions in Iraq: 
the foreign minister's sociopolitical background, the nature of his contacts 
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with other governments during the coup, the timing and tenor of his 
statements relating to "Barbarossa," and the speed and insistence with which 
he handled his pro-coup campaign. Again, it is important to stress that there 
is no one document which explicitly ties the foreign minister's efforts to 
perhaps dissuade Hitler from "Barbarossa."194 In any case, we will endeavor 
with those documents which are available to shed greater light on 
Ribbentrop's policy rationale during this crucial period of the Second World 
War. 
As his origins differed from those of most of the party's elites, the foreign 
minister had to be viewed as the most unlikely of Nazis. Brought-up in 
reactionary surroundings, marrying into Berlin's higher class, and vain 
enough to have himself adopted by an aristocratic aunt to gain the ennobling 
"von" prefix, Ribbentrop and his association with the Nazis proved an 
extremely odd marriage. Furthermore, as a seller of champaign, prior to the 
Nazi rise to power, Ribbentrop had a weakness for pomp and a definite lust 
for the "spotlight." As we shall see, Ribbentrop's duration as "special 
counsel" and foreign minister to Hitler certainly reflected a fundamental 
philosophical divergence between himself and the Fuehrer' s retinue of hard-
line Nazis. The following words of Paul Schwarz aptly capture the peculiar 
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nature of the Ribbentrop-Nazi relationship: 
The Nazi party is the limbo of lost and not as yet unrecovered types 
between the devil of philistinism and the deep sea of the superman. The 
philistine is catered to by grotesquely worded laws like the Gesetz zur 
Wieder einfuebrung des Berufsbeamtentums. by the reintroduction of 
grim discipline, by glorified provincialism like "blood and soil," peasant 
dances and beer. The superman, on the contrary, revels in gigantic, 
earthshaking plots, in an endless succession of "world historic decisions," 
in displays of immoral granduer a la Nietzsche and d'Annunzio, and in 
laying down the law to trembling continents. Ribbentrop is decidedly 
trying to sell the world the superman slant.195 
Furthermore, the following character of Ribbentrop, by John Weitz, makes 
the man sound like anything but a Nazi: "He was a rational, conventional 
man of conservative background, an international businessman who cared 
about his own and his family's place in German and foreign society."196 It 
should then be sufficient to say that, in view of his background, Ribbentrop 
did have a dimension to his personality which was, in some ways, unNazi-
like. 
How can one then account for Ribbentrop's association with the Nazi 
party? First, despite not being able to call himself an "old warrior" of the 
NSDAP, Ribbentrop did harbor a strong distaste for the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles and communism.197 Moreover, Ribbentrop's allegiance to Hitler 
was, for the most part, unswerving. As Weitz states, "From the day he met 
Adolf Hitler to the day he died on the gallows, even at those times when he 
received shabby treatment, Joachim von Ribbentrop never showed a moment 
of disloyalty to Adolf Hitler." Weitz further mentions that Ribbentrop, being 
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"the son of an officer in the Kaiser's Army," where "blind loyalty" was "the 
German officer's religion," "would lose his life for being unquestionably 
faithful to an evil man."198 Ribbentrop was able to articulate his attraction to 
Hitler's character and mission by recalling, at Nuremberg, the genesis of his 
most bizzare and, at the same time, slavish worship of the Fuehrer in 1932: 
Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression on me even then. I noticed 
particularly the blue eyes in his generally dark appearance, and ... his 
detached nature ... and the manner in which he expressed his thoughts. 
His statements always had something final and definite about them, and 
appeared to come from his innermost self. I had the impression that I was 
facing a man who knew that he wanted and had an unshakeable will and 
very strong personality ... I [was] convinced that this man, if anyone, 
could save Germany from the greatest distress which existed at the 
time.199 
An additional trait to be considered while trying to explain Ribbentrop's 
Nazi commitments was the foreign minister's unmitigated ambition. From 
the start of his career, Ribbentrop had a great liking for the world of 
diplomacy:--it meshed with his ostentatious and cosmopolitan lifestyle, and 
fed his thirst for affirmation and recognition. Through his travels and 
business-dealings, Ribbentrop had been able to construct a network of 
, associations and allegiances which, recognized by Hitler, benefited his rise 
within the Nazi government. What was more, Ribbentrop had connections 
with individuals in England, the land which Hitler was to covet for a future 
Anglo-German alliance. This, combined with the smashing success of the 
1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, put Ribbentrop at the forefront of all 
German diplomatic ventures. According to Bloch, the success of the 1935 




desire for better Anglo-German relations."200 Ribbentrop truly felt himself 
important--Hitler had given him an enormous amount of responsibility, and 
there is little doubt that, to Ribbentrop, he was Hitler's most trusted advisor. 
Such feelings of importance and self-aggrandizement persisted through 
Ribbentrop's rise to the rank of Ambassador to Great Britain in 1936, German 
Foreign Minister in 1938, and the months preceding "Barbarossa." 
One should now see that Ribbentrop focused his loyalty on three primary 
points--his conservative past, his Fuehrer, and his ego. This obviously made 
for a complex character. But, it is now possible to explain how Ribbentrop, 
despite his strong allegiance to Hitler, did harbor the potential to show a 
conservative side. He also possessed an eye for those situations which were 
most ripe for the fattening of his ego. A most telling remnant of Ribbentrop's 
reactionary past was the foreign minister's definite appreciation for diplomacy 
in the mold of Bismarckian Realpolitik. 
Germany's stratagem for the military conquest of Europe came under the 
daunting title of Blitzkrieg. Speed, surprise, and supply were vital to the 
correct execution of this new style of warfare. As the summer of 1941 
approached, and after impressively sweeping through the defenses of 
southern, northern, and western Europe, Hitler was now readied to unleash 
his Blitzkrieg upon the Soviet Union. The eastern campaign would afford 
Hitler an opportunity to address several different policy pursuits at one time. 
Anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevism, anti-Slavism, and the pursuit of 
Lebensraum. cornerstones of Nazi party doctrine, and found in the pages of 
Hitler's 1925 work Mein Kampf would form the basis for the massive 
invasion. In addition to these doctrinal concerns, Hitler ascribed a certain 
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strategic significance to "Barbarossa." Robbing Great Britain of her 
"continental sword," the Fuehrer was confident that London could be "forced 
into rapid surrender or else come to support the Reich as its 'junior 
partner."'201 The acquiescence of Great Britain to German demands, in 
addition to meeting strategic concerns, would also serve, as mentioned 
earlier, Hitler's desire to join have Great Britain join Germany at the head of 
an Aryan alliance.202 
Therefore, "Barbarossa" represented an opportunity for Hitler, "in one fell 
swoop," to deal with both ideological and strategic priorities. The eastern 
campaign further sealed the end of a conflict between camps seeking the 
primacy of either power or ideological politics in the guidance of Nazi foreign 
policy. According to Klaus Hildebrand, "Barbarossa" revealed the dissolution 
of a sort of "dual state": 
On the one hand, there was the rational power political component--
though it served goals which were themselves irrational and tainted by 
racism. The other face of this Janus-state was the irrational racist policy 
which reached full fruition under the banner of ["Barbarossa"], which 
Hitler regarded as his personal task.203 
This policy "stand-off" reflected elements of the "old" conservative ruling 
class, who aided the National Socialist party to attain power, and this same 
Nazi elite, who wished to replace the "old guard" with the "biologically" 
superior master race.204 In essence, "Barbarossa" secured the supremacy of 
racially motivated, ideology-based foreign policy, over that of traditional 
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The foremost advocate of the power-political camp was Ribbentrop. His 
traditional foreign policy agenda definitely harked back to the traditions of 
pre-Wilhelmine Germany, and stood in total opposi~ion to Hitler's foreign 
policy programme which was determined by racist ideology.2os Quite simply, 
the foreign minister believed in a strong policy of conciliation towards the 
Soviet Union, while at the same time, seeking the diplomatic isolation of 
Great Britain by this power bloc. Manifestations of Ribbentrop's efforts lay in 
the Anti-Comintern Pact 1936 (de facto anti-British), the Pact of Steel of 1939, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the Tripartite Pact of 1940 and the 
attempted Quadruple Alliance or Continental Coalition. Interestingly 
enough, one can find several occasions during Ribbentrop's diplomatic career, 
and the short time after, where he compared .his efforts to those of Bismarck, 
the most skillful and revered of all German diplomats and a stout supporter 
of Russo-German d~tente. In particular, during the Nuremberg Trials, the 
foreign minister, harking back to the consummation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
proudly stated that it "was undoubtedly an extraordinary success ... from the 
point of view of Realpolitik."206 He went on to say that "The abandonment 
of Bismarck's Russian policy had been the beginning of Germany's 
encirclement, which led to the First World War. In the situation prevailing 
in 1939, the return to the old tradition constituted, from the realist point of 
view, a security factor of the first magnitude."207 Ribbentrop obviously 
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relished his ability to bring-about a union between two ideological enemies, 
and moreover, in what the foreign minister was to call "the spirit of 
Bismarck."208 As it appears that Ribbentrop was influenced by the First 
World War and the consequent Versailles Treaty of 1919, it is possible to 
understand why the foreign minister coveted a Russo-German union and 
would do what he could to avoid the same diplomatic isolation which befell 
Germany in 1914-1918.209 As Ribbentrop stated in his memoirs, "This British 
policy of encirclement filled me with growing anxiety, and this cauchmar des 
coalitions, as Bismarck called it, also gave me many sleepless nights."210 
By the winter season of 1940/ 41, Ribbentrop, no doubt believing his 
mission inspired "in the spirit of Bismarck," was well into the development 
of the Continental Coalition. This "dream alliance" consisting of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and it was hoped the Soviet Union, would be dedicated to the 
destruction and absorption of the British Empire.211 Ribbentrop further 
hoped to add both Spain and France to the massive Euro-Asiatic bloc, 
intended to stretch from Gibraltar to Tokyo.212 As Ribbentrop stated in his 
memoirs, he presented Hitler with plans 
To convert the Three-Power Pact into a Four-Power Pact including Russia. 
If we succeeded in this our position would be favourable, for such a 
combination would neutralize the U.S.A., isolate Britain and threaten her 
position in the Near East. Such a strong system of alliances might make it 
possible to end the war with Britain quickly with diplomatic means; 
without it this was impossible.213 
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In view of Hitler's desire to complete an "understanding" of sorts between 
Germany and Great Britain, how can one explain his foreign minster's 
obvious contempt for the British Empire? Bloch submits two explanations 
for Ribbentrop's enmity for Great Britain. First, save the 1935 Naval 
Agreement, he had been a failure, both politically and socially. Ribbentrop 
was made to look foolish, by not only the London press, but the highly critical 
and snobbish London society. In short, the experience made Ribbentrop feel 
both snubbed and embittered.214 Moreover, the foreign minister's wife, 
Annelies, disdained the British for their high-handed posture and ridicule of 
her husband.215 
An event in Spain, albeit obscure, seemed to seal Ribbentrop's turn against 
England. On 29 May, 1937, the battleship Deutschland, participating in the 
arms blockade of the Non-Intervention Committee, was attacked by 
Republican forces.216 The Germans, in retaliation, shelled Almeria, but were 
insistent on other powers making a similar demonstration off Valencia. 
When the plea was refused, Ribbentrop, after exchanging barbs with Lord 
Privy Seal Anthony Eden, walked out of the Non-Intervention 
Committee.217 Quite clearly, the die had been cast. And only a few months 
later, in November, Ribbentrop was to present Count Ciano with plans for 
the coveted transcontinental anti-British alliance.218 
Despite the obvious admiration and subservience with which Ribbentrop 
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regarded Hitler, it should be possible to present the following theory: prior to 
"Barbarossa," Ribbentrop, for multiple reasons, might have considered an un-
tracking of Hitler's ideological drive to Moscow. In this particular case, the 
"earth-shaking plot" might have come in the form of an active Iraqi policy. 
A closer look at the foreign minister's conduct during the Iraqi coup can be 
introduced with the following excerpt from The Ribbentrop Memoirs: 
Throughout these [winter and spring months of 1941], I reminded Hitler 
of Bismarck's Russian policy. I left no stone unturned to achieve a 
German-Russian alliance after all. Perhaps I would have succeeded in the 
end had there not been that resistance on ideological grounds which 
always made the conduct of a foreign policy impossible. It was these 
ideological considerations, coupled with Russia's political actions, her 
military preparations, and lastly her demands, which painted in Hitler's 
mind a picture of a monstrous danger threatening Germany. In view of 
this my arguments counted less and less.219 
Ribbentrop's frustrations concerning "Barbarossa" were again reflected in 
his dictation of the following words to his Secretary of State, Ernst von 
Weizsacker, on 28 April, 1941: 
One can perhaps find it enticing to give the Communist system its death 
blow and perhaps say too that it lies in the logic of things to let the 
European-Asiatic continent now march forth against Anglo-Saxondom 
and its allies. But only one thing is decisive: whether this undertaking 
would hasten the fall of England ... A German attack on Russia would 
only give a lift to English morale. It would be evaluated there as German 
doubt of the success of our war against England. We would in this fashion 
not only admit that the war would still last a long time, but we could in 
this way actually lengthen instead of shorten it.220 
These are clearly the words of a frustrated man. Ribbentrop, if he were to 
make an impression on the planning of "Barbarossa," needed a distraction, an 
event which would produce immediate results, and give direct indication to 
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how fragile the British Empire was. 
The first indication of Ribbentrop's seriousness regarding Iraq was reflected 
by the speed and vigilance with which he pursued the matter. His sanction of 
"rapid and immediate" Abwehr and Foreign Office action in the Middle East 
should have left little doubt that the foreign minister wanted to exploit the 
possibilities of intervening in the region.221 The day after Ribbentrop and 
Woermann met, the foreign minister took the matter directly to Hitler. 
After roughly two weeks of waiting, Hitler, on 26 April, finally answered 
Ribbentrop's feeler.222 Although Hitler did approve the shipment of arms to 
Iraq, he was leery of the somewhat over exaggerated news that 14,000 British 
troops had disembarked at Basra with another 14,000 on the way. In fact, 
replying to the Foreign Office, Hitler expressed the belief that "in view of the 
English landings in Iraq, it was too late."223 But, on the next day, the foreign 
minister, perhaps sensing the impending veto, was quick to point out that 
"English sources [were] spreading propaganda figures that have no relation to 
the facts."224 In addition to pointing out to Hitler the impact which a pro-
British Turkey might have on "Barbarossa," Ribbentrop further directed the 
Fuehrer's attention to the effects which the continuous transit of the India-
based British troops might have on German operations in North Africa. 
Furthermore, one senses from Ribbentrop's brief that the foreign minister 
was attempting to stress to Hitler that preparations for pro-Iraqi operations by 
German, Italian, and Vichy French forces were indeed in progress.225 By 
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informing Hitler that the operation had already been initiated, Ribbentrop 
perhaps believed that he might have an easier time gaining Hitler's support. 
It is interesting to find that all of this came two days after Ribbentrop learned 
the exact starting date for "Barbarossa" on 25 April.226 
Meanwhile, on 3 May, one day after the commencement of hostilities at 
Habbaniya, Ribbentrop again lobbied for German action in the region. The 
foreign minister's plea took the following form: 
If the available reports are correct regarding the relatively small forces the 
English have landed in Iraq so far, there would seem to be a great 
opportunity for establishing a base for warfare against England through an 
armed Iraq. A constantly expanding insurrection of the Arab world would 
be of the greatest help in our decisive advance toward Egypt.227 
Ribbentrop sealed his brief to Hitler by adding, in handwriting, the 
following statement: "The figures regarding the British in Iraq show again 
how weak England still is today at the Suez Canal."228 Ribbentrop was 
obviously insistent on the promise of a move into Mesopotamia. Such a 
statement intimates a campaign of large scale proportions. In fact, a few days 
later, in a meeting with Italian authorities, Ribbentrop, again, drew attention 
to the potential of a sizable operation in the Middle East through Iraq. If 
Ribbentrop were sincerely loyal to the execution of the Russian campaign, 
why would he introduce an operation which would not only draw resources 
from "Barbarossa," but might also threaten the peace of the Balkans and Asia 
Minor which were, in Hitler's eyes, imperative for a secure southern flank 
during the Russian campaign? Furthermore, was it merely coincidence that 
Ribbentrop submitted two comprehensive memoranda relating to large-scale 
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operations in the Middle East (27 April, 3 May), plus an anti-"Barbarossa" 
statement (28 April), in a span of only eight days after learning the date for the 
Russian invasion on 25 April? 
It would seem appropriate to draw attention to the fact that Ribbentrop was 
not alone in pushing for action in Iraq. In fact, one can look directly to the 
conduct and comments of Woermann and Weizsacker, two diplomatic 
officials with conservative, anti-"Barbarossa" stances.229 Woermann, in 
particular, was of key importance in bringing to Ribbentrop's attention on 7 
March and 9 April, the potential of German operations in the Middle East.230 
An additional supporter of greater German action in the Arab East was 
Grobba, Ribbentrop,.s liaison to Baghdad during the coup. In his memoirs, 
Grobba stresses Germany's need to identify itself with Arab nationalism and 
its drive for independence: "In the last war, we did not take advantage of the 
opportunities that we had as a result of the friendly attitude of the Arabs 
towards us, because we did not promise the Arabs the independence that 
would have been a precondition for their active rebellion."231 
And although contact between the German military and the Foreign Office 
over the Iraqi situation appears to have been at a minimum, there were a 
number of officers, at this time, who, if not partial to the Arab East as an 
alternative to "Barbarossa," were at least aware of the region's great potential. 
Such an idea was part of a wider anti-British posture known as the 
"peripheral" strategy.232 The foremost advocates of the "peripheral" strategy 
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were Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander-in-chief of the German 
navy, and Hermann Goering, chief of the Luftwaffe233 Raeder, in November 
of 1940, felt that a campaign against Russia should be postponed, "until after 
victory over Britain, since demands of German forces would be too great, and 
an end to hostilities could not not be foreseen ... Russia, on her part, will not 
attempt to attack in the next few years."234 The naval staff further believed 
that operations in the eastern Mediterranean could prove "decisive ... for the 
outcome of the war."235 Five months later, on 30 May, Raeder, with the 
endorsement of the Italian premier, Benito Mussolini, went on to stress that 
the "Duce demanded urgently decisive offensive off Egypt Suez for Fall of 
1941; 12 divisions needed for that. This stroke would be more deadly to the 
British Empire than the capture of London; Chief, Naval Operations agrees 
completely ... "236 An additional document which reflects the attitude of the 
German Navy, in particular, Admiral Kurt Assmann, was made known in a 
briefing with Hitler on 6 June. Assmann's memorandum, outlining an 
alternative to "Barbarossa," reads as follows: 
The British power position in the eastern Mediterranean is under the 
severest pressure as a result of the Balkan campaign and the occupation of 
Crete, but it is ... not yet broken. All the signs indicate, moreover, that the 
British are in no way inclined to give up their position in the eastern 
Mediterranean. On the contrary, England appears determined to maintain 
her position in this area by every means. This is based, as in all areas of 
decisive importance for the British Empire, upon the exercise of control of 
the sea by the British battle fleet ... It alone is in the position to protect the 
maritime lines of communication which are essential for the control of 
233Bryant, 194-195. 
234w arner, 62-63. 
235Ibid., 165. 
236Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 November 1945--1 October 1946, vol. 5 (New York: 
AMS Press, 1971), 271. 
84 
the eastern Mediterranean position and to secure the power political 
influence in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and to a considerable extent in Turkey, 
with its ramifications in the African, Indian and even the Far Eastern 
regions. Upon its shoulders, too, rests the prestige of the British Empire in 
the eastern Mediterranean. As always, therefore, it remains the aim of 
German-Italian strategy to destroy the British fleet as the controlling factor, 
to drive it out of the eastern Mediterranean and to eliminate its bases and 
operational possibilities in the Mediterranean. 
Assmann then adds the caveat, that "in spite of other considerable demands 
upon German armed forces ("Barbarossa"), all current problems in the area 
must be tackled and all operational possibilities at present available 
unconditionally utilized in order to be able to exploit the full considerable 
successes recently obtained in the Mediterranean at a time when the help of 
the United States to England has yet to reach decisive proportions."237 
While viewing Assmann's and Raeder's statements with a critical eye, we 
must realize that, especially at this time of the war, the German Navy felt 
itself underused.238 In light of this, the Naval Staff's words may have 
amounted to nothing more than an attempt at lobbying. After all, it is 
difficult to imagine the Navy doing much in the way of aiding any operation 
as during no time of the war was it fully ready for combat against any member 
of the Allies. But, the fact remains that, despite its rationale, the German 
Navy, near the time of the Iraqi coup, was partial to anti-British action in the 
eastern Mediterranean. 
An additional advocate of a distinct anti-British policy was Goering. 
During testimony at Nuremberg, he believed that prior to a move on the 
Soviet Union, Germany should have "attack[ed] England at Gibraltar and 
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Suez." He went on to stress that "the exclusion of the Mediterranean as a 
theater of war, the key point Gibraltar-North Africa down to Dakar-Suez, and 
possibly extended further south, would have required only a few forces, a 
number of divisions on the one side and a number of divisions on the other, 
to eliminate the entire insecurity of the long Italian coast line against the 
possibility of attack." Goering concluded his views on a Mediterranean 
campaign, in lieu of an eastern one, by stating that he "urged [Hitler] to put 
these decisive considerations in the foreground and only after the conclusion 
of such an undertaking to examine further the military and political situation 
with regard to Russia."239 
One of the few contacts between the Foreign Office and the High 
Command of the German Army (OKW) supplies further evidence to the 
German military's interest in a Middle Eastern campaign. Speaking in 
response to a 4 February Woermann memo "regarding arms deliveries to Iraq 
and the associated Arab questions," the OKW, just the next day, "presented a 
summary of its wishes ... regarding a strengthening of German activity in the 
Arab countries."240 The OKW memo starts off by calling for a reexamination 
of Italy's freedom of action in the region, and as a result, making a move to 
redirect "political activity in the Middle East from Germany and to take quick 
and vigorous action in this matter." The memo goes on to stress the 
importance of the German "recognition of the independence of Arabia as a 
war aim of the Axis. We are in a favorable position in so far as we need not 
promise the Arabs a merely 'tolerable' solution of the Jewish question in 
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Palestine but can with a good conscience make the Arabs any concession in 
this field. "241 As can be seen, the OKW' s words amount to nothing close to a 
detraction of "Barbarossa." But, it is notable that the branch, although not 
proposing an alternative to the East, was recognizing the Arab East's needs 
and potential. 
Finally, one of the more fascinating documents relating to the interest of 
the German Army, Air Force, and Navy in pro-coup operations was drafted 
on 16 May. In it, the Head of the Foreign Ministry's Political Division "IM," 
Hans Kramarz, explains how the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe "After first 
viewing an operation in Iraq with skepticism ... now realized the importance 
of such an operation ... " The memorandum mentions, most importantly, 
that" A decisive factor in this connection was the foreign minister's personal 
letter to the Reichsmarschall. "242 Although no such letter from Ribbentrop 
to Goering has ever been found, and it is not clear as to why the military 
branches viewed an Iraqi campaign as so "important," one should find it 
significant that two figures, in Ribbentrop and Goering, who were highly 
skeptical of "Barbarossa," did find it easy to cooperate in the formation of a 
pro-coup operation. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned the 
following was envisaged: 
The Army envisages sending a military mission consisting of several arms 
specialists and general staff officers. Gehrcke has made a proposal on this 
subject in telegram No. 26 and suggested General Felmy as head of that 
mission. 
The Navy, in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, has instructed the 
cargo vessels lying in Bandhar, Iran, to attempt to enter the delta of the 
Shatt-al-Arab and then to scuttle themselves in order to hamper the flow 
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So, if Hitler could not give any sizable endorsement to action in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Arab East, leading figures in the German Navy, Air 
Force, and Army surely could. 
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Coming back to Ribbentrop, one might further conclude that the 
opportunity of including France in the Iraqi operation excited the foreign 
minister. Of course, Ribbentrop was quite fond of developing a Continental 
Coalition. Might he have viewed Iraq as an opportunity to resurrect the 
attempted alliance which had been scuttled back in late 1940? Hitler had 
turned away from closer relations between Vichy and Germany after Marshal 
Petain's dismissal of the pro-Axis Pierre Laval.244 Such a change in French 
leadership led to the opening of communications between the 
collaborationist government and both American and English governments. 
There were obvious tensions between Berlin and Vichy, but the chance of 
creating a joint Franco-German alliance made Ribbentrop believe that the 
French might "be prevailed upon ... to declare war against England, to make 
the French navy available to us for the fight against England, and to give 
bases ... "245 Much to the foreign minister's delight, a deal was struck by 8 
May which affirmed the conditions for Franco-German collaboration during 
the coup. And, as stated earlier, the first flow of Vichy supplies crossed the 
Iraqi border on 13 May. 
While meeting with Mussolini on 13 May, Ribbentrop took the 
opportunity to discuss the Iraqi situation. The foreign minister, thinking 
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quite independently from Hitler voiced the following idea to the Duce: "if a 
sizable arms shipment reached Iraq, airborne troops could then be brought 
into the area, which could then with the material on hand advance against 
the English and from Iraq, in certain circumstances, they could attack Egypt 
from the east."246 
As Mussolini favored such a plan, he found Ribbentrop's proposal worthy 
of consideration: "Iraq had to be helped in any case ... for in this way a new 
front would be opened up against the English and a revolt not only of the 
Arabs, but also of a great number of Mohammedans would be started."247 
What is more, Mussolini was particularly convinced of the notion that "the 
possessions of this center of the British Empire with its oil wells might have 
an even more profound impact upon the British world position than a 
landing in the British Isles themselves. "248 
The Italian leader, when meeting with Ribbentrop, was not aware of the 22 
June start date for "Barbarossa,'' a campaign which, on several occasions, 
Mussolini had admonished Hitler against waging.249 As far as Hitler's 
opinion of a pincer move on Egypt was concerned, he, on 20 April, while 
meeting with Count Ciano at Miinchenkirchen, quickly put to rest any idea of 
initiating an operation through Turkey and the Palestinian Coast on Egypt: 
"The possibility of attempting the operation by force can be ruled out 
Independently of Turkish resistance, which would be considerable, the 
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distance would make any military operation uncertain and dangerous."250 Of 
course, in view of the mammoth geographic commitment demanded by 
"Barbarossa," the question of distance should not have been an issue for 
Hitler in grounding a move on Suez through Turkey. In any case, Hitler was 
resolved to move east, and the acute British fear of a pincer move was 
uncalled for. 
The memoirs of the German Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen, not 
only lend further evidence to the seriousness of Ribbentrop, in regards to Iraq, 
but they also expose the distance which existed between the policy attitudes of 
the foreign minister and Hitler. Papen mentions the foreign minister's 
strong insistence that the German ambassador do what he could to loosen 
Turkey's regulation of war material traveling through its borders: 
"Ribbentrop was bombarding me with telegrams, insisting that I get the Turks 
to permit the passage of every sort of war material. Naturally, they declined, 
although they did allow the transport of petrol, which could not be defined 
exclusively as war material. I tried to get Ribbentrop to appreciate the Turkish 
position and disregarded his insistent demands to seek interviews with M. 
Saracoglu."251 When we compare the aggressive attitude of Ribbentrop 
relating to Turkey with that of Hitler's stark desinteressement evident is a 
wide divergence in what each man had intended for Turkey's role in the Axis 
effort. 
It is also true that Hitler did not favor any act which might threaten the 
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stability of the British Empire.252 A future alliance with Great Britain was 
fundamental to early Nazi ideology. As Hitler was to state in 1931, "We have 
no intention of destroying the British Empire. We have no objection to His 
Majesty's flag flying over Suez, Singapore, and Hong Kong."253 A more 
recent comment by General Franz von Halder, the Chief of the Army General 
Staff, on 21 May, 1940, noted what Hitler envisaged for Great Britain by stating 
that "We are seeking contact with Britain on the basis of partitioning the 
world."254 Interestingly enough, an additional reason for Hitler's indifference 
to Iraq rests within his aversion to conducting policy in concert with non-
Aryan peoples. In Mein Kampf Hitler believed that "As a folkish man, who 
appraises the value of men on a racial basis, I am prevented by mere 
know ledge of the racial inferiority of these so-called 'oppressed nations' from 
linking the destiny of my own with theirs."255 Just months after the coup's 
failure, and after the Japanese capture of Singapore, Hitler, in early 1942, 
predicted the loss of the Aryan influence in Australia and the Far East, and 
stated that impending rush of Japanese victories would mean "the loss of a 
whole continent, and one might regret it, for it's the white race which is the 
loser."256 Hitler's Minister of Information Joseph Goebbels, on 10 May, added 
to Hitler's Iraqi commitment by stating: "The Fuehrer does not think much 
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of the Arab's fighting capacity, and rightly so. They are not attuned to modem 
weaponry; they have neither the nerves nor the intelligence to use it."257 
Grobba, in his memoirs, also cites both racial and strategic concerns in Hitler's 
desinteressement in the Arab East.258 In consistency with Hitler's policy of 
Englandpolitik, Grobba believed that the Fuehrer saw Germany's strategic 
interests better served through a policy which was not threatening to Great 
Britain's imperial position in the Middle East. Moreover, Grobba felt that the 
emergence of Vichy France as a prospective Axis partner further pushed 
Hitler away from supporting any anti-imperial insurrection. As far as race 
was concerned in influencing Hitlerian policy in the region, Grobba referred 
to Hitler as "preacher of the superiority of the Aryan race who did not want to 
see that the Semitic Arabs could be a very valuable source of support for us." 
In any event, it is quite interesting that in a matter of days, Ribbentrop had 
made considerable contact with two prospective members of the proposed 
Continental Coalition, the foreign minister's most formidable alternative to a 
campaign against the Soviet Union. Again, because of this, one should not 
underrate the significance of Ribbentrop's attempt to bring these 
governments together into an anti-British operation, the only time during 
the war that it would be accomplished. 
Despite his concessions to Ribbentrop and the tardy Directive No. 30, Hitler 
was not prepared to make use of the Iraqi coup. Perhaps Ribbentrop should 
have seen the proverbial "writing on the wall" when Hitler sent his only 
qualified airborne force, on 20 May, to take the British occupied island of 
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Crete, a significant accomplishment for the protection of the "soft underbelly" 
of Hitler's Festung Europa. 
What was Ribbentrop thinking? From every indication it appeared in the 
spring of 1941 that Hitler was more than bent on moving east. But, for the 
reasons we have cited, the foreign minister endeavored to press on and 
produce a sizable operation in the Middle East. If we assume that Ribbentrop 
was even vaguely interested in "Barbarossa," would he have persisted to 
sanction actions which were clearly "pro-periphery," and, as a result, anti-
"Barbarossa"? In short, although it would seem doubtful to be wholly 
convinced of Ribbentrop's attempted sabotage of "Barbarossa," would it not 
seem even more careless to assume, despite the foreign minister's actions to 
the contrary, that he was fully sold on the Russian invasion? Ribbentrop was 
a high-level Nazi official, whose intentions in Iraq ran contrary to those of 
Hitler, in this case, an invasion of the non-Aryan peoples of the east. What is 
more, the documents tell us that Ribbentrop's intentions in the Middle East 
were not on a small scale. Would anyone in Berlin, in this case, be amenable 
to the launching of two major operations, each with separate intentions: one 
to hasten the destruction of the British Empire, and the other to force its 
peaceful capitulation? Granted, it has been established that it was intended, 
after the defeat of Russia, that German forces would indeed move into the 
Middle East. But, this was most likely contingent upon, again, the British 
Empire capitulating and becoming the Reich's "junior partner."259 
After the 30 May armistice in Baghdad, Germany was to cease further 
activity in Iraq. Furthermore, Ribbentrop endorsed "Barbarossa." Despite 
this, an interesting epilogue to the Iraq venture, giving further indication to 
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the bizzare inclinations of Ribbentrop and others within the Foreign Office, 
came in Hitler's eventual exclusion of the ministry from participating in the 
governance of occupied Russian territory.260 Of particular note, the man 
chosen to head such a task was Alfred Rosenberg, an extreme Nazi ideologue 
. and enemy of Ribbentrop. The foreign minister's participation in the Russian 
invasion went no further than the placement of a few of his ministry 
advisors and observers at Rosenberg's service.261 It is also telling that, in 
roughly a two year period, Hitler went from referring to Ribbentrop as "the 
next Bismarck," as he did at the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 
August, 1939, to viewing the foreign minister and his diplomatic retinue as 
nothing more than a group of "sluts."262 With total war with Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union, and soon the United States underway, there was simply 
little left for Ribbentrop to do. So, with the failure of Ribbentrop's Iraq policy, 
and the onset of "Barbarossa," the inevitable and tragic philosophical split of 
German foreign policy was complete--ideology had indeed won the day over 
Ribbentrop's twentieth century version of Realpolitik. Hurt, isolated, and 
even perhaps a bit angered, the foreign minister's frustrations during and 
after the Russian campaign are most aptly expressed in the following words 
from his memoirs: 
I do not know who at that time persistently influenced Hitler against me 
and the Foreign Office, but it is a fact that after the beginning of the 
Russian war Hitler told Reich Minister Lammers that there was a war in 
the East, and in war the Foreign Office served no purpose until the 
moment of the conclusion of peace. This remark shows Hitler's attitude 
to the Foreign Office as a government department; he rejected, perhaps 
even hated it, and I was never able to alter his attitude. I need not explain 
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how difficult this often made things for me.263 
The question most germane to Ribbentrop's intent during the spring of 
1941, was whether or not the foreign minister's actions, on the eve of 
"Barbarossa," were compatible with what Hitler would have viewed as 
acceptable Nazi diplomatic behavior prior to a major offensive? Vigorous 
pre-coup diplomatic activity within the Foreign Office, substantial contact 
with proposed members of the Continental Coalition, the foreign minister's 
anti-"Barbarossa" sentiment, and the "tenor and timing" of the Foreign 
Office's conduct seem to indicate anything but an affirmative answer. 
Ribbentrop reveled in his diplomatic victory of August 1939. He had 
accomplished what many viewed as the impossible. For a moment in time, 
Ribbentrop was, at least to himself, a diplomat of Bismarckian dimension. 
The Nazi-Soviet pact suited his fickle, egotistical, and reactionary past. With 
this in mind, and considering his pre-"Barbarossa" actions, it simply does not 
seem possible that Ribbentrop would allow Hitler to fritter away the crowning 
achievement of his life without a fight. By many indications, Iraq could have 




Arab nationalism's general impotence, Germany's, or perhaps more 
appropriately, Hitler's disinterest, and Great Britain's necessity to act, 
comprised the formula for the Rashid Ali coup's outcome. As a prism of 
history, the coup exposed traits which were to dominate Axis and Allied 
policy for the duration of the war: Germany's future was to be guided or 
misguided by the instinct-driven will of Hitler which found culmination in 
the Fuehrer's race war, "Barbarossa"; conversely, despite further hardships 
(Dieppe, Singapore, 1942), Great BritaL11 persisted to fight, and, what is more, 
found itself bolstered by American and Russian allies which enabled her to 
not only maintain its empire, but liberate Europe from Nazism. 
It is most probable that if Hitler, during the spring and summer of 1941, 
had decided to move into the Middle East that he would have been able to 
take the region in a matter of months. In fact, the force needed, perhaps 
twenty to thirty divisions (armored and infantry), would have amounted to 
one-sixth of that assembled for "Barbarossa."264 This would have enabled 
Hitler to knock an already crippled England out of the war, while still being 
able to defend the eastern frontiers from the Soviet Union should the latter 
choose to breach the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This, for the reasons stated, would 
have seemed the rational thing to do. The Arab East, during the time of the 
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Baghdad coup, was highly susceptible to attack. If taken, it would have 
yielded an unquestionable number of strategic advantages. But, despite the 
fact that many leading Germans, including Ribbentrop, Goering, Raeder, and 
Assmann, coveted the idea of such a campaign, it was the will of Hitler which 
finally prevailed. 
The Germans, at this time of the war, had much that was going their way. 
Berlin possessed impressive weaponry, a wave of momentum from the many 
victories it had claimed over the previous two years, and the luxury of choice; 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union were staggered by Germany's European 
successes--Berlin was certainly in a position of dictating policy to London and 
Moscow rather than the other way around. The Germans, even after the 
Battle of Britain, had options: They could invade Russia, storm Gibraltar, or, 
in the eyes of many British experts as the most logical thing to do, initiate a 
pincer movement on Suez, and bring about the British Empire's death knell. 
However, after months of shirking opportunity, Hitler finally chose to move 
east. Aptly enough, Kennedy mentions that "if the Germans had 
concentrated on the Middle East for the next few months, it is very doubtful 
whether we could have held it. But Hitler, with his Russian plans, was about 
to come to our aid, as he often did at critical moments of the war."265 
What London did possess, however, was the Middle East and its two most 
vital commodities: the Suez Canal and massive oil stocks. In other words, 
Great Britain's options were scaled-down to simply defending and keeping 
what was hers. Of course, it was the Baghdad coup which prompted London 
to view the region's significance with a more serious eye. And, knowing 
what it did at the time of the coup, in as far as German intentions were 
265Kennedy, 114. 
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concerned, Whitehall was wise to the fact that it could not afford to be 
tentative, and its effort in Iraq reflected as much. 
Knowing that a German concentration of forces in the Middle East would 
have probably resulted in an Axis victory, it is easy to understand why 
German policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 1941 is worthy of 
so much criticism. Assuming that Hitler had been dissuaded from 
"Barbarossa," and, as a result, opted for a drive into the Arab East, what might 
have Germany gained? The most obvious advantage to be gained by an Axis 
move south would have been the enormous amount of oil to be had through 
the occupations of both Iraq and Persia. Germany would have also been in an 
excellent position to flank, and, as a result, threaten Soviet oil fields in the 
Caucasus. When we speak of oil, we are immediately exposing perhaps the 
greatest Achilles' heel of the Axis side. Italy's ability to participate in Axis 
operations had been severely curtailed after its navy's oil stocks ran out in 
June 1941.266 And, as early as February 1941, the Italians were requesting 
some 57 4,000 tons of oil in "supplementary requirement for the first half of 
the year 1941."267 As the Italian Navy held a crucial role in the Axis attempt 
to neutralize the Royal Navy's predominance in the Mediterranean, we can 
then assume that the presence of new oil reserves would have eased the great 
strain strapping Axis supply lines at this time. One might further conclude 
that the extra oil lifted from the Middle East would have afforded Hitler the 
enormous versatility and energy needed for a Russian campaign, assuming 
that he would have eventually gotten around to one. Furthermore, in view 
of the Suez Canal's significance, one can infer that an effective German pincer 
266warner, 167. 
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would have, at the very least, hindered the flow of communications and 
supplies from the east to the west. So, needless to say, an exploitation of the 
Baghdad coup could have easily changed the face of the war, as it would have 
afforded the Axis massive stocks of oil which would have revitalized the 
needed Italian Navy, and provided fuel for future Axis campaigns, of 
particular note, "Barbarossa." Not to mention, Axis victory in the Arab East 
would have isolated British possessions in East India, Singapore and East and 
South Africa. 
In the realm of diplomacy, we must consider the resulting ramifications 
had Ribbentrop, through the coup, been able to strike an alliance with Vichy 
France. With this in mind, can one assume that Anglo-American forces 
participating in operation "Torch" of November 1942, would have 
experienced the same peaceful disembarkment, had Vichy been an active 
participant in the Axis cause? This, of course, would have had a sizable 
impact on the Anglo-American effort to break Axis power in north Africa and 
eventually southern Europe. "Torch" was crucial to the American effort to 
obtain a foothold in the European war. The operation was also pivotal in the 
Allied effort to allay Russian concerns over the seriousness of its western 
allies. So, with the Allies, in the first three to four years of the war, too weak 
to invade the continent, it was imperative that they, for reasons of public 
opinion and fundamental diplomacy, conduct "Torch." However, with all of 
north Africa in Axis hands, Anglo-American efforts to attain that crucial 
bridgehead would have been hindered. 
Despite the strong probability of Axis success in the Middle East, the 
potential problems accompanying such a campaign are obvious. First, 
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Turkey, a vital land bridge into the Levant and Mesopotamia, persisted to 
remain attached to Great Britain through the Sabadad Pact of October 1939, a 
treaty which despite its questionable integrity, the Germans believed to be "a 
very real threat."268 The nature of the mutual assistance treaty, for much of 
the war, was hindered by Turkey's great desire to remain neutral. Moreover, 
Field Marshall Kurt von Brauchtisch, Commander-in-Chief of the German 
Army, felt that the OKW had no evidence to support the assumption that the 
Turks would not fight back if attacked. With this in mind, Brauchtisch 
believed that nothing short of five armored divisions, three motorized 
divisions and twelve infantry divisions, would be needed to secure Turkey 
and could not be mounted until 1942.269 
Second, Germany, while moving south would have to keep in close 
consideration, the territorial sensitivities of the Soviet Union's Josef Stalin. 
As stated, a Middle Eastern campaign would have not only put into jeopardy 
the Soviet Union's southern flank, but it also would have threatened Russian 
oil reserves in the Caucasus. It was, after all, in November of 1940 that 
Ribbentrop had guaranteed to Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov a 
free Soviet hand in the Persian Gulf.270 Invading the Arab East would have 
presumably signaled an end to such good will, and, by virtue of this, a prirna 
facie break in Russo-German relations. One can conjecture that, in Hitler's 
eyes, the resulting tension of a Middle Eastern campaign would have 
268semil Deringil, "The Preservation of Turkey's Neutrality During the 
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threatened the largely stable nature between l\foscow and Berlin, something 
which Hitler viewed as desirable prior to an attack on the Soviet Union. 
Although it is easy to postulate German victory in the Arab East an almost 
certainly, we cannot assume that the massive booty of oil which would have 
accompanied such a victory would have been an easy move from the Middle 
East to Axis forces in Europe or north Africa. Of particular consideration for 
Germany would have been the possibility of an English contingency plan for 
the capping or destruction of the region's most crucial oil wells and pipelines, 
lest they be utilized by the Axis.271 We do know that the British War Cabinet 
did consider a contingency plan for the demolition of the Caucus oil fields a 
must, especially in the first months of "Barbarossa."272 
The story of the coup is, in essence, a story of dualities. For instance, it 
certainly meant something that during the revolt one side was winning the 
war while the other was on the verge of losing it. This notion goes quite a 
ways in explaining why the British government grasped the affair with 
urgency while Berlin paid it relatively little attention. Furthermore, a nice 
irony surfaces when one realizes that the greatest freedom of action was given 
to Ribbentrop of totalitarian Germany while the least was exhibited towards 
Wavell of democratic England. Be that as it may, it is clear that the will of 
each country's respective leader would prevail in the end. 
Accompanying our analysis of Ribbentrop's "bizzare" Iraqi venture, a sort 
of dilemma arises. As much as we may concede that there is not enough 
evidence to confirm the intent of Ribbentrop to dissuade Hitler from 
"Barbarossa," there certainly is enough information for us not to disregard 
271 Bryant, 203. 
272Kennedy, 148. 
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such a possibility. Because of this, we should not regard the argument that 
Ribbentrop's actions in Iraq were of an anti-"Barbarossa" posture, as anything 
more than conjecture. 
In addition to the primary policies of each government, we have also seen 
that alternative strategies were present: for Ribbentrop, Iraq represented a 
golden opportunity to bring down the British Empire, while, for Wavell, the 
coup appeared to be the "last straw" in a series of Axis triumphs which, to the 
general, seemed anything but irreparable. The latter viewed negotiated 
settlement as the safest option. 
Did Wavell have any foundation to believe that the conduct of "Habforce" 
would foment pan-Arab elements into action? An immediate question to be 
counter posed might ask to what extent Iraq could be looked upon as a 
legitimate nation-state? In the same light, one might wonder how effectively 
the concept of nationalism could be applied to Iraq and other Middle Eastern 
states? The following words of King Faysal, spoken in 1933, may give some 
indication of Iraq's heterogeneous nature: 
In Iraq there is still ... no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human 
beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with religious traditions, and 
absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to 
anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government 
whatsoever.273 
So, Rashid Ali, in 1941, had to face much of the same that Faysal did in 
1920--this polyglot, multi-ethnic, multi-religious land was what the Iraqi 
premier had to turn to in his appeal to revolt. An additional barrier to the 
conspirators in their nationalistic call was the tribal nature of much of Iraq's 
rural population. In this tribal framework, allegiances went no further than 
273simon, Irag Between the Two World Wars, 3. 
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the local shaykh. Baghdad's efforts to assert some sort of centralized mode of 
rule over the tribes were made manifest in taxing, and conscription, two vital 
factors in the legitimization of any government seeking centralized rule.274 
But, seeing their role in the traditional tribal feudal order threatened, 
shaykhs, on several occasions, raised revolt against Baghdad.275 And as 
government reactions to the uprisings were often violent, it is easy to see 
how the already high degree of alienation between the two camps was only 
exacerbated. It is also important to emphasize that the doctrines of Arab 
nationalism could hardly "trickle-down" below the class posture of Iraq's 
urban-centered educated elite. There was really no way by which the 
government could communicate with the great mass of Iraqi tribesmen--in a 
socioeconomic sense, they lived worlds apart. Making matters worse, the 
rural population was plagued by a high rate of illiteracy. Sir Arnold Wilson 
offers corroboration: "These people are utterly unvocal, like all uneducated 
masses, and it is impossible to find out all what they think about 
government. We deal with them largely in mass, through their shaykhs, and 
the shaykh' s view of government is an objectionable means of extracting 
money ... "276 Quite clearly, Baghdad was embroiled in a struggle between 
nationalism and localism, and until it could assert the former's primacy, any 
call to revolt would be hollow. 
So, despite that fact that Wavell and Cornwallis might have feared it, and 
Grobba coveted it, Arab nationalism, in the author's opinion, was not a factor 
274E1ie Kedourie, Chatham House Version and other Middle Eastern 




which would have hindered or benefited the efforts of either side in the 
spring of 1941. What is more, upon beginning this work, the author found it 
easy to be drawn to the idea that festering at the heart of Great Britain's Iraqi 
policy was a concern for the volatility of Arab nationalism. It took little time, 
however, to discover that this thesis was false--rather than halting the spread 
of Arab national fervor, Great Britain's policy was driven, as we have seen, by 
its fear of an impending German pincer movement on Egypt and the Suez 
Canal, and the loss of its crucial oil reserves in Mesopotamia and Persia. 
Wavell's performance prompted Churchill, after the coup, to remove the 
general from the Middle Eastern Command in favor of Auchinleck. The 
prime minister's audacity to intervene and take control of the Iraqi crisis 
quickly closed any doors which Arab nationalist and German alike might 
have viewed the coup as opening. This, in essence, aided Great Britain and 
her future allies in averting what could have been a very different war. 
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